Note: This is the culmination of a several-year-long project working with Professor Mustafa Aksakal at Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. This work was produced as part of Aksakal's 2026 book: "The War That Made the Middle East: World War I and the End of the Ottoman Empire."
French archival sources concerning the Near East during the Great War are organized in a chronological system and begin with the title “Serie de Guerre” (Series of War) followed by a number. While the vast majority of these documents are French diplomatic correspondences and reports on Syria/Lebanon/Palestine, there also appear documents from Turkish, English, and other sources. I have organized the contents of the documents below into five categories corresponding to each year of the war. References to “Syria” generally include the territory of Lebanon and exclude the territory of Palestine unless stated otherwise.
1914
At the beginning of the First World War, the French high command viewed the Ottoman Empire as weak and divided, a ‘sick man of Europe’ subject to foreign influence. Both the British and the French believed that Ottoman territories could be incited to revolt against the Turks, to the benefit of the Entente. The British favored supporting Arab leaders under the Ottoman yoke, keen to rule their own Arab states after the war. Moreover, an Arab revolt would relieve pressure from British forces defending the Suez Canal. The French believed that an Arab revolt should be supported, but that it was dangerous: if it failed, their Algerian and Tunisian subjects would be more likely to revolt, if it succeeded the French would maintain their loyalty.[1]
Outside of Muslim Arabs, the French looked to other populations within Ottoman Syria (encompassing Lebanon) and Palestine. The Maronite Christians were good candidates to support against the Turks, although the British at times supported and were wary of supporting Maronite insurrections at different times in 1914. [2][3] Already in September 1914 (before the Ottomans entered the war on October 29th), the Lebanese community residing in Egypt informed the French that they supported a French invasion of Lebanon[4] and in December they had already formed lists of Lebanese men prepared to take part in such an invasion.[5]
According to François Georges-Picot in September, the French could count on 30-35,000 Lebanese to join any French expeditionary force in Lebanon, which would only need to be composed of 1,500-2,000 troops and officers. He continued by stating that the Greeks were prepared to send the Lebanese 15,000 guns and 2 million cartridges, concluding that if hostilities between France and Turkey break out this option should be seriously considered.[6] In October, Picot claimed that the longer the French do not act, the weaker the anti-Turkish forces in Lebanon become; however, Picot coldly offered his opinion that it would be unwise for France to accept the asylum of those groups refusing to support the Ottoman Empire.[7]
Yet by November, after the Ottomans officially entered the War, circumstances had changed, and intervention looked more dangerous. M. A. Defrance, the French Minister in Egypt, made clear the French position that intervention in Syria now (in November) would present many more difficulties than 6 weeks prior, as Turkish troops were now stationed in Syria/Lebanon. He continued his assessment by clarifying that the Ottoman army is relatively weak and the French have wide support among the local population.[8] In another document, also from November, Defrance clarified that there would be more cons than pros in intervening in Syria at the current time because it would risk compromising the lives of French/Allied nationals living in Syria and prisoners of war.[9]
Although it looked unfavorable to intervene in Syria, the French were also conscious of the threat they faced from their own ally: the British. Believing they alone had special privileges to Syria and Lebanon for historical reasons, the French claimed that they needed to be the power to liberate the region from the Turks. Defrance thus expressed worry upon learning that Italy had sent Cruisers to Beirut, the British had begun recruiting Syrian interpreters who argued independence depended on Britain, and that the first operation off the Syrian coast was executed by a British cruiser “Doris.”[10] The French, asserted Defrance, cannot let another power liberate Lebanon.[11] The Lebanese wanted to end Turkish rule and, although favorable to the French, would support any power helping them to that end.[12]
In November, the French sent two battleships off the coast of Syria for reconnaissance, a mission which eventually expanded to a full blockade of the Syrian coast.[13] Before this occurred, however, Emmanuel Pharès, the representative of the Maronite Patriarch in France, informed the French that Syria was in a worse state than in 1860: the lack of French ships off the coast led many Syrians to believe that the French had abandoned the Maronites. He continued by claiming that the Turks would forcefully relocate the Maronites to Damascus where they would be massacred. France needed to ensure the population that it will help them and Pharès suggested sending a boat from Egypt with French arms to the Lebanese.[14]
In a dossier likely from 1914, but without a date or author, the French considered various options for intervention in Syria, considered strategically significant for France’s moral reputation in the Orient.[15] The plan offered three possibilities, identifying the pros and cons of each. 1) Naval Blockade; 2) Full Military Intervention; and 3) Limited Military Intervention. The advantage of option 1 was that it would not require much resources, would demonstrate to the locals and the world that France cares about the populations of the region, and would not breach international law. The negative consequences included: Turkey could massacre local populations, the Ottoman military could bolster its defenses, and the local populations might be less willing to accept a French protectorate (without direct intervention).
The primary advantage of option 2 was that France would certainly acquire all of its desired territory at the end of the war. Additionally, full intervention would help prevent the massacres of Christians by the Turks, the Greek/Armenian/Syrian separatists would be greatly encouraged to resist the Turks, and such an intervention would relieve pressure from the Russians in the Caucasus. The disadvantages centered on the incredibly high costs rendering such an intervention impossible at the time the document was written.
Option 3 had the advantage of, at a lower cost than 2, developing greater trust with the natives, ensuring Lebanese autonomy under French influence after the war, and weakening the Ottoman capability to conduct war. The cons were that some ships would need to be immobilized. The author favored this option and suggested a plan wherein a police corps occupied Cilician ports around Mersina, Alexandretta, Tripoli (in Syria), Beirut and Rayak (to cut rail lines), and Sidon (Saida, also to cut rail lines).[16] In a document outlining the operations of such a mission, the composition and placement of Turkish forces in the Near East were demarcated. That document gave clear guidelines for the mission and assumed that Muslim and Christian Syrians were Francophiles who would reinforce expeditionary forces.[17]
One of the reasons that the French believed they could amass such support among the Syrians has to do with information they were getting from within Syria, but also from without Syria. In November of 1914, MM. Mokarzel from the Lebanese League of Progress, an organization created by Lebanese immigrants to the US, wrote to the French government. He said that the 150,000 Lebanese in the US support the French effort to liberate Lebanon and affirmed that the population – especially the Christians – would welcome an occupation by Allied soldiers. He asserted that they desire full independence under the supervision and protection of the Allies.[18]
At the end of December, an in-depth analysis of the situation in Syria and Lebanon was outlined by Raymond Marteau (?), director of the exploitation of the railroad between Damascus and Hama and the Port of Beirut (Directeur de l’Exploitation du Chemin de Fer de Damas à Hama et du Port de Beyrouth) to the Plenipotentiary M. Gout.[19] The author explained that the Turkish authorities ordered all French, English, and Russians living in Beirut to move to the interior of Syria. The American Consul in Beirut, Mr. Nollins, transmitted a petition against this action and also suggested boarding Allied citizens on an American Cruiser, the “North-Carolina.” The Ottomans agreed to decrease their demands, yet all male French/English/Russian citizens had been brought to Damascus. Diplomats had been imprisoned.[20] Moreover, the authorities closed all European schools, expulsed the Jesuits, and restricted the influence of the pro-French Vali of Beirut.
The letter continued by examining the military situation in the region. There were three army corps in Syria: one from Mosul, one from Aleppo, and one from Damascus. While the troops were generally mediocre or of poor quality, German officers had begun to train Turkish officers – something which led to the development of some anti-German sentiment among the Turks. The Germans suggested that the Turks cut the railroad line at Jamhom (?) in case of an Allied intervention in Beirut and bring artillery there. While at the beginning many Turks spoke of a swift German victory, some felt their dignity was insulted by the German presence and now feared they had nothing to gain and everything to lose from the war.
The document referenced the views of the natives as well. All resistance at the moment was impossible as the Lebanese lacked both arms and leaders and feared massacre at the hands of the Turks. Moreover, the Lebanese – especially the Christians – continued to call for French intervention despite the propaganda in the press. Indeed, the press was full of “German lies” which had led to a greater sectarian divide between Muslims, who hated the Allies, and Christians, who were more sympathetic.
This sentiment among the Muslims had been changing, however. The Turkish government effectively stopped commerce in Syria and expropriated property which led even some Muslims to support the intervention of a foreign power. Expropriation, starvation, and anti-Turkish sentiment amongst the Muslims of Syria was confirmed in another set of documents by M. P. de Reffye, the French Consul in Alexandria.[21] The letter stated that the Turkish authorities were purposely starving the local population by forbidding the transportation of cereals to the region. The author presumed that the Germans wanted to starve the populace in order to encourage French intervention, but he did not expand on why (perhaps in order to distract the French from the European theater).[22]
1915
In the second year of the Great War, generals across Europe and Asia began to realize that the conflict would be drawn out. The war, not over by Christmas, wreaked havoc as countries lost 10s of 1000s of soldiers each week. Tensions and anxieties heightened. Some saw the expanded war as a means to demand even greater concessions. Propaganda became ever more insidious, and allies began to distrust one another. In the Near East, the French finally set up a complete naval blockade stretching from Samos to the Egyptian border on August 25th.[23] Already on June 2nd, the British organized a blockade at the entrance to the Dardanelles.[24]
The French, having a vested interest in Syria, grew increasingly concerned about the actions and intentions of the British. Sir Edward Gray affirmed that Britain would not embark in Syria without a preliminary accord with France in June, yet this did little to assuage French anxieties.[25]
In a long report from July, the French described their understanding of the British position on the Near East.[26] The British War Office created a two-volume report on Syria: one about its geography and another about the future possibility of occupation and expeditions there. A source claimed that the British intended to invade Alexandretta on the Syrian coast but were delayed by the experience at Gallipoli. The planned invasion of Alexandretta worried the French, although they confirmed to the British that the French disapproval was purely a military concern and not a political concern about having British troops fight in French zones of influence.[27] After having affirmed that France sees Syria in its region of interest, Britain changed its stance to favor Haifa over Alexandretta and Beirut as a possible point of attack. The French later affirmed that they trusted the British to respect French rights in Cilicia and Syria.[28]
According to the French, the British held that they needed some territorial concessions in Syria (encompassing Palestine) in order to protect their Egyptian colony. Various Arabs and some Brits who want to see an Arab state after the war favored a union of Egypt and Syria. The British, in sum, saw three options: an autonomous British Syria, a Syria divided between Britain and France, or a British Syria that was not autonomous but under direct British rule. The British also considered taking Medina and Mecca and most of all desired a land route connecting Egypt to the Indian Ocean.
The French distrusted the British. In one instance, the British flew French planes over Syria and dropped pamphlets praising the British administration in Egypt. In addition to the spread of anti-French propaganda, the removal of French naval ships from the coast was seen as a worrisome act decreasing French influence and prestige. A Syrian Muslim committee established in Egypt was suspected of being funded by the British.[29] According to the French, the Catholics were pro-France, the Orthodox pro-Russia, and the Muslims and Druze pro-Britain. The French government avowed that it would never respect a Syrian protectorate that was not French. It believed Palestine should be French, or at least the area around Jerusalem should be an international zone. Damascus, it was argued, should be an internationalized city much like the Vatican but for the Sharif of Mecca.[30]
According to a translated article from Berlin in August, the Germans saw the situation differently than the French. The British, said the Germans, wanted to create an Arab protectorate against Turkey encompassing Syria. The French knew that the Muslims preferred Britain to France based on the situations in Algeria and Tunisia, and despite this wanted all of Syria. According to the Germans, the French government was blatantly lying when it suggested that it would create an independent Syria: everyone knew after the war France would not grant the Syrians independence. Moreover, while the Germans admitted the Catholics might be pro-French, the majority of the population (Orthodox Christians, Muslims, etc.) hated France. The Germans concluded the article by affirming the German commitment to Turkey and suggesting additional reforms to resolve any lingering frustration against the Turks. Should the French be foolish enough to invade, Syria would break out into an ethnic civil war and the famine would worsen.[31]
Regardless as to the desires of the local population or the ‘propaganda’ of other countries, the French already knew their position on the future of Syria – it would become a French protectorate after the war (see map[32]). The French Chamber of Commerce of Saint-Etienne asserted that France should be compensated for its participation in the war with Syria and Palestine, the New Hebrides, and German African territories.[33] With this position already in mind, the French government took steps to assess the economic potential of the country in June. The study concluded that the economic value of Syria would be approximately equivalent to that of Greece with a lot of potential for economic development.[34] France’s economic ties with Syria were acknowledged, as France was already the primary European importer of Syrian products. Another, similar, economic study was produced in January of 1916, summarizing the administrative divisions’ economic potential and tax revenue through a host of statistical data.[35] Additionally, the French government took into consideration a letter from the Chamber of Commerce in Lyon. That letter outlined the desires of merchants, who hoped for a French protectorate in Syria after the war and the establishment of French merchants in that region, who were especially interested in Syria’s silk.[36]
Why did France claim Syria as a special interest? What would be the legitimacy to French rule there? In an extensive report from December of 1915, the French sought to answer these questions by tracing the history of French influence in the region.[37] According to the analysis, France had long been the defender of Christianity in the Ottoman Empire and French rights date back to the crusades. Especially in Syria, France had a long and rich history of special influence. The French language was common in Syria and the French had funded hospitals, schools, and missions. Under the French justice system, the country would prosper and the local populations would cease to feel oppressed by the corrupt and backward Turkish administration.
Regarding the actual situation in Syria, and in the Ottoman Empire as a whole, the French were deeply worried by the reports that they have received. In 1915, following his appointment as governor of Syria, Djemal Pasha earned a reputation as a repressive, if effective, leader. Defrance claimed that there were daily hangings and executions in Syria,[38] which increased anti-Turkish sentiment among Arabs,[39] and also relayed notes from Mr. Tonmeh, a Syrian refugee from Beirut, to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September. The letter provided important information on military infrastructure projects and the status of Turkish soldiers and trenches in Syria.[40] Equally interesting is the state of Syria which Mr. Tonmeh describes: food was scarce in Beirut and the population began to starve; many people were imprisoned; officials suppressed religion; the draft and martial law were put in place, etc. The Syrian also mentioned how the American Consulate has begun to employ poor Christians and Muslims to keep them from starving. Additionally, the local authorities in Damascus were passing out weapons to the Muslim population in order to massacre the Christians once Constantinople fell.[41]
The veracity of the claims may be doubted, yet there are other sources suggesting that minorities in the Empire were being oppressed or were ready to revolt. In one note from the French Ambassador in London, it seemed as though there was the possibility of supporting an Armenian revolt in Cilicia by the Armenian Committee of National Defense, but that such an action would lead to massacres.[42] Another note confirms the existence of massacres against the Armenians already taking place in December.[43] Mr. Mokarzel, from the Lebanese League of Progress, also wrote to the French, urging them to respond to the barbaric actions of the Young Turks who massacred Christians in Syria, especially around Mount Lebanon.[44]
In Syria, the situation worsened for the locals as explained in a letter addressed from Athens to Washington by an anonymous Syrian.[45] Although Pasha had been asked to allow grain to be transported to the coasts of Lebanon, this action had yet to materialize. Goods in Beirut reached unaffordable prices and the harvest would not be enough to keep the population out of starvation. Additionally, the draconian measures of martial law and the draft took their toll on the population and the number of refugees continued to rise. The latest news was that 252 refugees escaped to Chania aboard the American ship “Des Moines.”
The French realized that they needed to do something in response to these oppressive measures to demonstrate to the Syrian population that the French cared for them. One of the most significant steps taken was the French occupation of Arwad (called Ruad) off the Lebanese coast on September 1st, 1915. Defrance called this action an important sign to the Syrians of France’s commitment to their well-being.[46] The Syrians welcomed the capture of Ruad and hoped that it meant a greater occupation was soon to come.[47] The French, however, concluded that plans to land at Adana or anywhere else on the coast were unrealizable at the moment, and tightened their coastal blockade.[48] One of the reasons that the French did not consider further operations is because they expected and prepared for an assault on the Suez Canal.[49][50]
Yet, many in France and abroad believed that the French invasion of Ruad was not enough on its own. In a letter to the Minister of the Marine, Vice-Admiral Darreius argued that France is losing its reputation daily in Syria due to its inaction.[51] The Syrians, like the Armenians, wanted weapons to fight against the Turks, and he authorized 20,000 rifles to be sent to Port Said to be distributed. The population of Syria was suffering, he asserted, not only because of their treatment by the Turks, but because of the French blockade. Increasingly desperate, Syrians sought refuge on Allied ships, but he coldly concluded that the French neither had the capacity nor the desire to accept a large number of refugees. His preferred plan of action was to intervene in a more meaningful way – with an expeditionary force – should France want to uphold its reputation among the Syrians.
1916
By 1916, Sykes and Picot had corresponded multiple times regarding the future of the Middle East following the assumed victory of the Allied Powers. Ultimately, their discussions concluded with the famous Sykes-Picot agreement presented in 1917, though already effectively decided by March of 1916. At the beginning of January, the French government composed a memo regarding the negotiations with the British.[52] In that document, Sykes confirmed British recognition of France’s influence in Syria, Lebanon, and the region east of Homs around Deir ez-Zor. He wanted British possessions after the war to extend up through Palestine (where the Holy sites would be internationalized) to the city of Tyre as well as Mesopotamia including Mosul. Additionally, the French and British concluded questions regarding river navigation and commercial rights in Alexandretta.
Sykes wrote a document – also from January of 1916 – in which he outlined the competing interests in the Middle East between the local actors.[53] The French were concerned with the Catholic and Maronite populations of the Ottoman Empire and have special interests in Mosul, Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut. French public opinion favored annexing both Syria and Palestine. The Arabs, meanwhile, desired an independent Arab state after the war but Sykes saw this as impossible administratively and financially speaking. He believed that Arab states under the influence and protection of France and Britain was a more desirable outcome and attached a map dividing the region into French and British spheres of influence. Finally, recognizing that Jews, Christians, and Muslims are all interested in the area around Jerusalem, he envisioned rendering this area an internationalized zone.
A series of discussions between the Russian diplomat Sazanov and the French Ambassador in Russia considered plans for dividing the Middle East after the war.[54] The French and British wanted to see an Arab state under their protection. The British wanted a railway between Iraq and Alexandretta without an increase in tariffs for 20 years. The Arabs would supposedly have an equal voice in debating the borders of French and British zones, while commercial and transport right in Alexandretta were to be confirmed. Finally, there would be control measures put in place to limit the importation of arms into the future Arab state.
After his meeting in Petrograd, Sykes came to the conclusion that the Allies should intervene in Alexandretta around October.[55] In May/June, he thought 350-400,000 Ottoman troops would be in Erzincan and Diyarbakir to fight the Russians, and an Allied distraction in Syria could be decisive. In April, according to Sykes, such an expedition was impossible due to the lack of transport ships, but if the Russians lost the Caucasus, then they would be forced to transfer troops away from fighting the Germans.
Meanwhile, groups in France became more explicit about their desires for the future of the Near East. The Commercial Geography Society of Bordeaux expressed a desire for the complete annexation of Syria to France after the war from Taurus to Egypt, and from the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia.[56] The Society of Colonial and Maritime Studies believed, rather, that France should 1) return the caliphate to the Arabs with an independent state 2) preserve the rights and livelihoods of people in Lebanon/Syria, and 3) make an alliance with the UK and the Arab state.[57]
The state of affairs in Syria and Lebanon grew worse over the course of the year. A set of translated articles from an Egyptian paper “Al-Mokattam” from the first few months of 1916 outlined the increasing desperation of the local populations. In one set of articles, the author describes the pitiable harvest in Syria on account of a swarm of locusts.[58] It continued: the population had little to no confidence in the paper money circulated by the Ottoman authorities but could not protest because of the severe consequences of such an action – 816 Syrians and 117 Mesopotamians had already been sentenced to death and their property seized for actions against the state. The lack of transportation limited the amount of coal along the coasts, and in response the locals deforested the country to burn wood. Typhus broke out and many Syrians became sick. The Greek Orthodox Bishop Mr. Gerassimos Messara was forced to take refuge in a convent, though he was later acquitted. The article concluded by describing the increasing number of refugees who tried to swim to French-controlled Ruad; in response, the Turkish authorities prohibited fishing past a certain distance.
Further articles from Al-Mokattam described the plight of the starving population and argued that the Ottoman government could have prevented the famine but did not care about the Arabs. It also noted how the paper money had almost no value.[59] Another article confirmed the suffering of the Syrians and Lebanese and expressed hope that the Allies would intervene.[60] Al-Mokattam also outlined the state of Anatolia and Constantinople: there, restaurants and hotels were closed, famine was widespread, commerce had stopped, and sentiment turned against Enver Pasha and the Germans.[61] The French government received corroborating reports from Cairo, which asserted that the upper class in Lebanon had either been executed or imprisoned and the Turkish authorities had systematically hungered the population. According to that source, Enver Pasha reportedly claimed “Nous avons supprimé les Arméniens par le fer ; nous supprimerons les Libanais par la faim” (We eradicated the Armenians by iron; we will eradicate the Lebanese through hunger).[62]
Despite corroborating reports, such as from the paper Al-Ahram,[63] the French argued that Al-Mokattam articles exaggerated the misery of the populations in Lebanon and Syria.[64] Further articles by the paper described how Ali Bey Munif, a unionist and Germanophile, has been appointed the new governor of Lebanon. The election was rigged to be pro-Unionist, according to the paper. A different article asserted that the Unionists wanted the Arabs to starve.[65] According to the article, an American was denied his request to deliver food to Syrians, to which he replied “Mais ils mourront de faim!” (but they will die of hunger!). The Turkish functionary purportedly responded “C’est précisément ce que nous voulons” (that is precisely what we want). Moreover, the Lebanese were portrayed as living under a regime of terror where, when enlisted, they were forced to do menial work with low supplies.[66] One article described the reasons for the ongoing famine in Anatolia. The famine was due to immigrants from the rest of the country, the fact that the Sultan was ignorant of the situation, the increasing power of Enver Pasha, and the exportation of food as well as copper/metals to Germany, something the government in Constantinople as trying to hide from its hungry population.[67]
Indeed, the situation in the rest of the Ottoman Empire was also deprived. One report confirmed that many emigrants moved to the interior of Anatolia, where food and resources were lacking.[68] It continued to describe growing anti-German sentiment and the increasing presence of German troops in Turkey as German families returned to Germany. Another set of documents noted that famine spread to Constantinople and only the importation of flour through German negotiations with Romania had decreased the city’s exasperation.[69]
Two refugees from Syria, the Christian Arnouk Risquallah and the Muslim Moustapha Bey, came to Egypt and shared their accounts to the French, largely verifying the extent of the suffering.[70] According to their stories, both Muslims and Christians in Syria were prepared to revolt at the first indication that they should do so by the Allies. Sickness and discontent were rife throughout Syria. Although there were disagreements as to whether the population would accept status as a European protectorate, it was believed that the Turkish authorities would exterminate the Arabs should they attempt to set up their own caliphate and that the Turks would massacre the Christians in Beirut should the French land an expeditionary force there. Due to the extent of the suffering, most of the population – especially the notables – would welcome French or British intervention.
Bey and Risquallah also relayed information that after the Russian attack in the Caucasus and the failed attack on Suez, many Turkish troops abandoned Syria for Turkey.[71] French inaction led many Arabs to begin favoring the British, and they warned that if France did not act, Britain may demand everything after the war. By not helping the Armenians, France had already lost its principal allies in Cilicia – it must not make the same mistake in Syria.
The misery in Syria can only be described as horrific. In a document likely from the early part of 1916, but without date, an estimate is given that, since January, 80,000 Syrians had died of starvation.[72] The document painfully described locust swarms and how people had begun to eat cats and dogs for food. Enver Pasha wanted to clean the Ottoman Empire of Armenians and the Lebanese, according to the report, and all merchandise and commercial goods en route from Damascus were seized by the authorities. Another document described the exile of populations and the persecution of the Druze, Christians, and Matwallis. The Turks purportedly said the Christians are only valuable until the harvest, after which they would be massacred.[73] For this reason, another undated report urged France to intervene before the harvest, but also implied the population was more likely to revolt when hungry.[74]A dossier without date noted the death of the Greek Catholic Patriarch, the selling of Christian (Armenian) women to Muslim men, and religious repression.[75]
The Lebanese and Syrian diaspora, aware of the situation in the Ottoman Empire, expressed their desire to aid their brethren. Mokarzel from the Lebanese League of Progress accused the Turks of breaking international agreements by denying the Lebanese autonomous rule and replacing the Christian governor with a Muslim one.[76] Constantin Melham, a Lebanese Argentinian, expressed his support for France and offered any services he could provide to further the Allied cause in Syria. He met with Defrance and his mission was approved, but upon arriving in Cairo he was detained and believed to be a German spy.[77] The French minister in Venezuela meanwhile sent a correspondence to Paris relaying information that Syrians and Lebanese in that country were willing to send funds to their displaced relatives in the Ottoman Empire.[78]
A major event of the early part of 1916 relates to a series of documents from the French Consulate in Beirut. The French possessed a protest signed by numerous Christian and Muslims in Lebanon which demanded the French annexation of the country. For a while, the American Consulate had protected the papers, but in March or April they were seized by the Ottomans.[79] According to French documents without a date, 82 Muslim and Christian families had been exiled from Beirut into the interior and their property seized due to these documents. Additionally, many faced capital punishment – an article from “Al-Balagh” described death sentences for those named in the protest.[80]
The Maronite Patriarch, who returned from the Levant, informed the French of the extreme lack of food, the prohibition on the entry of goods into Lebanon, the court martialing of priests (and the Patriarch himself), and Muslims and Christians compromised by French Consulate documents.[81] Meanwhile Djemal Pasha, since the victory at Gallipoli, became completely Germanophile and oppressive in Lebanon.[82] He supposedly drove his soldiers by fear and sought to use the Maronite Patriarch for his own political purposes. The Patriarch suggested that even if the French intervened by May, it would be too late.
In an extract from a letter written in May, an interpreter in Ruad contended that the events in Lebanon were a prelude to a massacre, much like the massacre of the Armenians.[83] Individuals listed in the Consular documents were tortured and killed. The author described the consequences for the traitors: children were forced to watch their parents hanged, a woman was burned alive, another Syrian was thrown into melted iron as punishment. The estimate of 80,000 dead from starvation was repeated, and the letter concluded by calling for a small French expedition into Syria. They must do this as Turkish atrocities could partly be blamed on the French Consulate documents.
In another set of letters from the Ruad interpreter, his plan for French intervention was outlined.[84] He wrote that the inaction of the French saddened him both for the suffering of the population in Lebanon and for the war, suggesting that intervention would yield impressive military results. The author – likely in a move to arouse French fear and guilt – evoked the British desire to encroach into the French zone and mentioned how people were compromised because of the Consulate documents. The Turks sold the harvests to Germany with the double purpose of starving the locals and leaving nothing in case the French did decide to invade. The Druze and the Metwalis grew impatient and hopeless as France failed to act, while the Muslims and Christians in Lebanon supported France. He asserted that only a few thousand French troops would be necessary to occupy the whole region, as the locals would immediately join them. The Turks were deporting Christians to the interior of the region and prepared defenses, such as trenches, on the coasts. The Maronite patriarch said that the Lebanese were dying as martyrs for their love for France. The interpret concluded that he did not know what the best course of action was: diplomacy, military intervention, or the installation of a refugee camp.
A French agent, called “Koneri,” was paid 5,000 francs by Paris in order to attain information on the true state of Syria and Lebanon.[85] The Maronite priest Father Jaussen sent a detailed report back to the French on the mission of Koneri, informing them that the agent might be biased as he was a pious Maronite.[86] The mission began well as Koneri was able to bypass a group of soldiers after landing on the Lebanese coast. He learned that the Maronite Patriarch was held in Diman and supposedly spoke with the police before he was caught. After exchanging gunshots with the police, Koneri escaped on foot across Lebanon to Damascus, then Homs, Tripoli, Beirut, and finally Ruad. His accounts confirmed the great suffering, starvation, and desperation throughout the Levant, in part caused by French Consular documents.[87] Additionally, Koneri wrote about the propaganda in the local papers: they emphasized the poor economic state of the Allies, Russian internal disorder, the imminent Allied abandonment of Salonica due to the strength of Turkish forces, and the continued neutrality of Romania and Greece.[88]
Already in January, the French detailed the possibility of intervention in the Levant. Vice-Admiral Moreau wrote the Minister of the Marine about the possibility: the French could immobilize a substantial part of the Ottoman forces with relatively few troops.[89] He described how Turkish soldiers were undersupplied and said that the French needed to act quickly and secretly by invading Cilicia in order to cut off supply lines to Constantinople. The Armenians, Lebanese, and Syrians could be armed and Moreau states that he was willing to take full responsibility for any such operation. Ultimately, nothing came of this plan.
Following the seizure of Consular documents implicating various Syrians and Lebanese families in conspiring with the French, officials in Paris considered intervention more seriously. The French Ambassador in Washington sent a note describing the serious danger that would accompany any expedition.[90] He argued that intervention would risk reprisals against the inhabitants. Pierre de Margerie came to the same conclusion and urged the French to discourage public demonstrations which could anger the Turkish authorities and lead to massacres.[91]
In another set of documents, the French listed the advantages and disadvantages of intervention.[92] The document began by describing the defeat at Gallipoli and the atrocities committed by the Turks against those listed in the Consular documents. It continued by outlining growing anti-Turkish and pro-Allied sentiments and argued the French must act in order to maintain the sympathy of the Syrians. Any French intervention – be it in Beirut, Haifa, Tripoli, or Alexandretta – came with pros and cons. The advantages included: helping the local populations, improving the French reputation in their North African colonies, encouraging further anti-Ottoman insurrections, boosting Russian morale, damaging Turkish communications, and releasing some pressure on British and Russian forces already engaged with Turkish troops. The disadvantages listed included: reprisals and massacres against Christians, high costs in terms of resources and manpower, the uncertainty of success, and the fact that it would take two months to plan, compromising General Sarrail efforts in the Balkans.
In June, France drew up another detailed summary of the military situation in Syria.[93] The Turks were benefitting from the acquisition of German planes and intelligence. Despite this, Ottoman troops remained undersupplied and had low morale. The Ministry detailed troop numbers, canon numbers, and naval mines off of the Lebanese coast. Large tribes refused military service, and Djemal Pasha was intent on attacking the Suez Canal. Sykes – recently in Petrograd – relayed information that the Russians wanted the French to intervene in Alexandretta.[94] Sykes contended intervention in October would be the most beneficial, as at that time the French would have more transport ships available and better weather. He feared that if the Russians were forced to retreat, the internal stability of Russia would be at risk.
The French faced a lot of pressure from different sides in order to act in Syria and Lebanon. The Commission of Exterior Affairs demanded that the French government do something to end the suffering in Syria, for instance.[95] Meanwhile, Defrance wrote in May that Syrians from around the world had offered money to help the region.[96] That same month, Defrance stated that he dissuaded Syrians from coming to Paris, because the French population and government was already on their side.[97] Such is evident by the growth of a French Action Committee in Syria formed in Paris the following month.[98] The Committee detailed a military plan for invading the region.[99]
The Maronite Patriarch in Egypt also begged that the French intervene, and worried that the blockade was hurting the Syrians, something which the French denied – they blamed Turkish authorities.[100] In a set of letters from Mr. Akl, the secretary of the Maronite Patriarch, France was accused of abandoning the Maronites and Mr. Akl described how some Maronites turned to Vienna for protection.[101] In a German newspaper, putting further pressure on the French to act, Salah Bay Djimjoz claimed that no Turk takes France seriously and that any influence France may have had in Syria was gone.[102]
From a set of documents without date and without a clear author (it looks to be from a former student of “Mr. Lavigérie” (likely the North African French Bishop Charles Lavigérie)), a call for the immediate occupation of Syria and Lebanon was made.[103] The author argued now (likely the early part of 1916) was the perfect time to intervene as the Turks were occupied with the Russians in the Caucasus and Syria could produce a force of 100-150,000 soldiers. The documents detailed which ships to use and what personalities could be persuaded to garner pro-French sympathies. It seems the author was writing to Mr. Joseph Saboungi, a definite former student of Mr. Lavigérie, offering his services.
In their efforts to distinguish the truth from propaganda, the French commissioned extensive reports on the state of Syria and Lebanon. In one report analyzing flour, they confirmed the poor state of Lebanese bread.[104] The reports generally corroborated other accounts of the suffering. One set of documents reveals: a meeting between Djemal Pasha and the Patriarch only led to three wagons of wheat being sent to Beirut, Cholera spread especially around Aleppo, the Muslim Arabs were increasingly anti-Turkish, and notables had been hanged for shouting “vive la France!”[105] Turkish sources denied any particular anti-Christian actions have taken place in Lebanon,[106] but French documents confirmed religious repression and mass suffering.[107] Many documents corroborated reports on the gravity of the situation in Syria.[108] The most egregious reports revealed the cruel and despotic nature of Djemal Pasha,[109] the selling of hundreds of Armenian women to Muslim men for 2 francs each,[110] and the persecution of the Beirut Patriarch who said he wanted to die wrapped in a French flag.[111]
By May, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs told its Minister in Cairo that at this point in time they were convinced that a military intervention would bring more negative consequences than benefits.[112] Their solution was to correspond with the United States which, as a neutral state, could negotiate with Istanbul in order to alleviate the situation in Syria to some degree. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Ambassador in Washington of their plan and asked about developing an American Committee for aiding Syrians.[113] Concurrently, Mr. Schedid, the representative of the Maronite Patriarch in Rome, received info from about American Maronites wanting to help Syrians by sending goods and wants to know if the Allies would be alright with it.[114]
As the French plan to use their relationship with the US to aid the Syrians began to play out, the British offered their opinion. They agreed that the US could be of assistance, but at least Lord Robert Cecil was against the idea of the US directly sending aid to Syria/Lebanon.[115] The Americans would be better off having demarches in Istanbul to convince the Turks to remedy the situation themselves, because the blockade could be rendered ineffective should the Americans directly send aid. Lord Cecil was explicit in another document: giving aid to Lebanon and Syria would be to abandon the blockade which had just begun to bear fruit.[116] He argued that the Arabs must be encouraged to revolt and any support for them was contingent on this: “C’est bien le point de vue anglais; considérer la famine comme un agent qui déterminera les Arabes à la révolte.” (It is well the English point of view; consider the famine as an agent which drives the Arabs to revolt).
The French reporting on Lord Cecil strongly disagreed, contending that the Arabs would only revolt if they felt supported by the Allies, not if they were hungry.[117] Doing something would show the Arabs that neither the French nor the English had forgotten them. If ships passed through the blockade in appropriate intervals, then the blockade will not be rendered futile. From a political point of view, he did not think it would be negative to allow word to secretly spread that the real origin of the aid was France. He concluded that the American directors of any aid program must know that it was important to help Muslims as well as Christians.
In June, Americans performed demarches on behalf of the Syrians in Istanbul but to no avail. They sent strong notes to Istanbul about inevitable negative effects of Ottoman actions on US-Turkish relations.[118] A diplomatic correspondence between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador in Madrid from July revealed that the American government continued to conduct demarches on France’s behalf in Istanbul.[119] Turkey had not yet agreed to a neutral party distributing goods in Syria and the US Consul in Beirut believed around 50,000 died of hunger. The Spanish Consulate did not believe the Turks were trying to systematically starve the population but agreed that the suffering was immense. Two former US ambassadors (Herrick and Bacon) came to aid humanitarian efforts in Syria. The French awaited a response to their request for the direct intervention by the King of Spain on behalf of the Syrians.[120]
Frustrated by the lack of success of American efforts in Istanbul – the Turks continued to resist appeals to allow an American committee to distribute aid to Syria/Lebanon – the French called for patience and consider it their responsibility to hinder anti-Turkish protests which would hurt the negotiations further.[121] While originally the German Ambassador stated that he was moved by the humanitarian crisis and said he would do what he could to realize the French mission, he later changed his mind, maintaining there was nothing abnormal in Syria.[122] The Turks continued to use delaying tactics. While the French estimated that, rather than 80,000 dead, there were 50,000 dead Syrians due to starvation, the Spanish Consul in Beirut denies any systematic hungering of the population and placed the number at 20,000 dead.[123]
Although the Turkish-American negotiations continued to disappoint, Mr. Schedid, the procurer for the Maronite Patriarch in Rome, was aware and grateful for the French efforts to help his nation. It seemed that Djemal Pasha wanted to reconcile with the Maronite Patriarch and he was allowed to go back to Lebanon with foodstuffs for the population. Schedid believed this was thanks to American and French efforts in Constantinople.[124]
In July, the French strengthened efforts to convince the Spanish to support the Syrians. Senator Etienne Flandin wrote to Madrid that Spain could help by performing demarches in Istanbul with the following demands: 1) reestablishing communication between Lebanon and other provinces 2) authorizing neutrals and Lebanese abroad to bring goods to Lebanon 3) allowing Spain to oversee the distribution of goods in Lebanon, and 4) permitting a Spanish boat to land in Lebanon with aid.[125] A couple of days later, French documents imply that the King of Spain offered a warship to assist in the humanitarian effort. Additionally, the US said aid efforts could be organized in Barcelona with the Hispano-American Committee, and continued its demarches asking for supplying Syria as had happened in Belgium. Importantly, the British informed the French that were mission undertaken, it would not affect the blockade.[126]
By July, the Spanish fully confirmed that they were honored to participate in French objective to supply the populations of Syria.[127] In spite of the continued lack of success in negotiations with Istanbul – the Ottomans claimed the famine was the fault of the Allied blockade[128]– the Americans were persistent[129] and implied that if progress was not made, US-Turkish relations would be irredeemably damaged.[130] The Americans meanwhile informed the French that they feared no progress would be made lest the Germans changed sides on this point, and suggested bringing the German Red Cross in to the mission in order to attain Germany’s support.[131] Meanwhile, the Vatican separately communicated with the Turks as well, putting further pressure on them to permit the Americans to distribute aid in Syria.[132]
By August, the Ottoman government continued to deny any crisis in Syria, and the Spanish increased their efforts to allow a supply ship to land.[133] Vice Admiral Dartige du Fournet wrote to the Minister of the Navy about a list of supplies which should be sent to best aid the local populations.[134] He argued giving money to buy goods directly from the Turks would be better than giving goods, which the authorities could easily appropriate. Thus, he authorized 13,000 francs to be sent to the Patriarch who would distribute the money as necessary. Meanwhile, Mr. Mahbouh El-Khoury published an article in “Ech Chaab” in August, which gave the insider perspective on events in Syria.[135] He argued emigrants who criticized the Ottoman Empire made it worse for those still there. The Turks killed innocents with the justification that they would one day become criminals. His solution was that all the Christians embrace Islam and Islamism.[136]
In September, as the Turks began to give ground, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs let the French Ambassador in Washington know that the French had begun to doubt the utility of the aid package. Specifically, they feared that the Red Crescent – which would help distribute aid alongside the Red Cross – would simply take advantage of any goods supplied. It was possible that very little would actually get to the population which needed it.[137] Additionally, the French were wary of repeating an event from earlier in the war, when the American cruiser Des Moines sent aid to Jerusalem after having stopped in Alexandria. In Alexandria, Syrians illegally smuggled money onto the ship before it sailed for Jerusalem.[138] By early October, if not earlier, the American government received effective (not explicit) approval from the Turks for supplying Syria with certain conditions.[139]
By mid-October, the Americans still did not receive official approval from the Ottoman government on supplying Syria. The Ottomans reaffirmed their stance that the reports of famine were exaggerated and that the political pressure was more deceptive than presented. They said it would severely damage relations with the US. Finally, after Spanish requests to allow the Red Cross to oversee a joint Turko-American distribution, the Turks granted official approval. Although it was less than the French had hoped for, the American Red Cross was happy about the progress. Rather than making a new committee to supply Syria, as had been planned, the French decided to use an existing American committee because a new committee might look too French to the Turks as it would be led by two former US ambassadors to France.[140]
Eager to help the suffering populace, the Americans prepared a ship with aid by the end of October. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs corresponded with the French Navy: they agreed it was best to wait for more details from the Ottomans before allowing the ship passage to Syria.[141] In another letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Navy, the French agreed to allow an American ship to bypass the blockade of the Syrian coast as long as the Red Cross managed aid distribution– they did not want the Turks to exploit the generosity.[142]
In November, the Ottomans granted Spain permission to send a ship with aid to Syria organized by the American Red Cross in conjunction with the Red Crescent.[143] The US ship “Caesar” was chosen, and the aid aboard the ship purchased by the Comité de Secours pour la Syrie.[144] On December 19th, Caesar left New York for the Mediterranean and delivered Red Cross relief supplies for Syria at Alexandria. Caesar entering the Mediterranean on the 31st, arriving at Alexandria the 10th of January (or the 8th per a different document),[145] and thereafter sailing to Beirut.[146] The ship would have flour, cereals, oil, sugar, milk, gasoline, and also clothes and medicine for the American community in Beirut. [147][148] In Cadiz, Caesar was planned to pick up Mr. Philippe, the American Consul at Constantinople, to help pass out supplies to the Syrians.[149]
The French expressed frustration at their limited capability to do more than help organize the Americans sending aid to Syria, as doing so little damaged their reputation in Syria and Lebanon. From the documents, it is clear that the French, especially the French Action Committee on Syria, were serious about their support of the well-being of the Syrians and collected funds for them.[150] The Society of Aid for Syrians and Maronites amassed 400,000 (francs?) in Egypt to be sent to Syria and the Maronite Patriarch asked for subsidies from the French government.[151] Additionally, Flandin asked Mr. Briand to give 100,000 francs to the Patriarch via Ruad to distribute among the population to buy food;[152] the Patriarch had asked for a loan of one million francs after describing – according to the French without exaggeration – how 45,000 Syrians starved to death.[153] Pharès also asked for more money and lamented the terrible effects of the famine.[154] The Patriarch concluded that only an occupation could save Lebanon.[155] Sympathizing with the plight of the Syrians, the French wondered why neither the British nor the Russians took action to aid the Syrians, as the French were busy fighting the Germans on their own territory in Europe.[156]
The old tensions between the British and the French never went away, and that tension flared again in October. The British wanted to attack el Arish in order to protect Egypt and asked the French to organize a revolt in Syria in order to distract the Ottoman forces.[157] The British planned to then send an expedition through Palestine. In response, the French government first agreed with the intent of the proposal, but nevertheless rejected it as it was in the French zone of influence and Paris was not able to spare the 40,000 men which they estimated would be necessary to spark a popular Arab revolt.[158] Finally, France reminded Britain that the latter agreed that the French military would take the initiative in Syria and for this reason it could not support any British military expedition against el Arish.[159]
One area where the French and the British did reach agreement was on the significance of the Sharif of Mecca. In a correspondence to the French Ambassador in London, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote that it agreed with Defrance and the British government on the importance of the Sharif of Mecca in emanating authority in the Muslim world.[160] In a note to Colonel Brémond, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the Sharif of Mecca ordered the recognition of his authority among the Syrians.[161] The French believed that if the Sharif could organize an efficient administration and judiciary, he would receive friendly intervention and support from both the French and the British which would increase his popularity. The British agreed completely.
On the military front, Turkish forces, local starvation, and French actions were all related. The Ottoman authorities purchased a lot of grain and cereals, possibly to help the locals, possibly for the army, but without a doubt to send in part to Germany.[162] In September, an informant in Switzerland relayed information that the Ottomans might try another attack on the Suez Canal in October. The French doubted the credibility of the source, believing it to be counterespionage (which it was).[163] Meanwhile, Turkish force movements were closely monitored and suggested to the French that the Turks were preparing for an Allied expedition in Syria. Armed with this information, the French were much less likely to intervene despite the continued starvation of the population.[164] Additional reports which discouraged French intervention include those on Djemal Pasha. Pasha was gathering strength and subverting efforts to develop an anti-Ottoman revolt. He had improved his popularity among the people by distributing food and organized a religious meeting denouncing the Sharif of Mecca.[165]
A report from October revealed the extent of the revolution of Djemal Pasha’s image.[166] Although still described as cruel, now he was depicted as worried and paranoid. He was attempting to gain the support of various Arab and Bedouin tribes, with limited success. Yet he successfully expunged three revolts against the Empire, and he did much to restore and revitalize the military. German specialists arrived to improve military infrastructure in the Near East, and Pasha’s power grew. Moreover, he oversaw the distribution of food to the starving populace in Lebanon and protected Armenians living in Jerusalem from the genocide; the Greeks did not fear him. Finally, the report noted that he declared a Fatwa against Hussein and has met with various religious leaders.
Despite ultimately deciding against intervention at this time, the French seriously considered the possibility. Pharès insisted that the Allies could bomb coasts and instigate a rebellion, as Syrians were united in their hatred of the Turks.[167] An undated document by a Vice Admiral of the Navy, most likely from the second half of 1916, argued in favor of intervention.[168] Germans wanted Muslims all over (i.e. in North Africa, India) to revolt against the Allied powers. They wanted to spread word to Africa through the rail in Syria, which the French could not allow, according to the document. Syria was strategically located, and its coasts were hardly defended. The French should intervene militarily and support an uprising of the local population. The Vice Admiral finally argued that if the French could take Damascus, the Turks would lose all credibility in the eyes of Muslims.
Some among the French believed that now (September) was the last opportunity to successfully intervene. Paul Cambert (?) wrote to Briand that starvation would soon kill the “Christian nations” of Syria. With their demise, argued Cambert, any and all French influence in the region would die. General Murray dreamt of debarking a force in Beirut, but it never occurred. Cambert ended the letter by affirming the importance of action now and asking: does France want to help or abandon these faithful populations? In mid-September, another detailed report on the possibility of intervention is made, with the recommendation that the French support an uprising among Syrians, after which they will send a military expedition.[169]
From August until December, the French made extensive efforts to accurately understand the state of Syria and Lebanon. In sum, the situation worsened: there was famine, disease, oppression, and suffering. A report from Defrance in August confirmed all of this, while also implying that 50,000 soldiers would be needed for an expeditionary force along with a great deal of supplies, as only 8,000 Lebanese were capable of fighting due to starvation and political repression.[170] Additional reports corroborating the extent of the suffering include a letter from Aristide Briand in September,[171] one from Ernest Picard-Destelan in August,[172] and a report from L. Kokan in July,[173] among others. The French clearly blamed Ottomans policy for deliberately starving the populace, not the actual lack of foodstuff.[174]
A report from a Syrian informant revealed that political life in Syria was gone.[175] It continued: the Turkish authorities ration out the food and it looked as though there was a good harvest. In November, a set of documents revealed the role of Djemal Pasha, who organized the purchase and distribution of food with fixed prices throughout Syria.[176] The report argued that the famine was increasing in intensity in Lebanon, though Pasha succeeded in appeasing local Arabs and Druze. Finally, Pasha ordered Maronite priests and the Patriarch to confirm the good condition of the country to the foreign press. On the military front, a Navy testimony described an impressive force of 7,000 soldiers and many canons protecting important targets between Haifa and Afula.[177] In late November, the Turks officially suppressed the privileges in Lebanon.[178] A letter from another Syrian without date noted that the Turks were distributing the food to the Muslims first, and that if the Russians occupy Birejik and Urfa, then there would be no food at all.[179] The author said that next winter France would be to blame for many innocent deaths.
In December, believing the aid for Syria organized by the Red Cross was not sufficient, Lieutenant de Vaisseau and the Governor of Ruad Albert Trabaud outlined a more detailed way of supporting the Lebanese to the Vice Admiral.[180] Trabaud explains that he believed the Germans and Turks conspired in 1915 to exterminate the Lebanese via an economic blockade. The lack of goods and money in Lebanon led to 110,000 deaths. The French, he argued, should use Ruad as a base for supplying Lebanon via a fleet. Now was the time to execute the operation because of the good weather and vulnerable state of the Lebanese.
While the American cruiser Caesar set sail, another ship became the focus of many diplomatic correspondences – the USS Des Moines. American Zionists, worried about the state of Jews in Palestine, collected funds to send supplies through the blockade on an American cruiser. Already in June, the British government relayed a request by American Jews to obtain 20,000 francs worth of citrons for Jews in Palestine for Festival of Tabernacles.[181] In August, the French Minister of the Navy agreed to the request of American Zionists to send 10 doctors/nurses to Palestine.[182] The American government eventually saw Des Moines as a good ship to supply populations in Palestine.
According to a document from October 7th, on September 27th the US had sent a request to the French that they allow Des Moines to arrive in Palestine.[183] Americans and those in the process of becoming naturalized would board the ship and be allowed passage to the United States. The ship would also drop off Kosher wine and medicine in Palestine. The French Minister of the Navy said he would not object to the request as long as those leaving Palestine did not return before the end of the war or communicate with relatives remaining in the Near East. Additionally, he warned that agreeing to this request puts the French in the awkward position of having to agree to similar requests by other neutral countries in the future. Moreover, the move risked worsening the situation for Christians, as the presence of foreign nationals had previously restrained the Turks from outright massacring Christians. Later in October, the Americans thanked France for allowing passage, and agreed to drop off doctors at a later date.[184]
In a set of documents, the case of foreign nationals departing via an American ship was considered. Briand wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that American ships were authorized to take 150 Americans out of Syria, and that the Americans would be willing to help a certain “Strass-Moscowitz” family with consent of the French government.[185] The family, Romanian in origin with five children, received approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to leave Jaffa in December.[186] About a week later the location was changed to Beirut, and Admiral Spitz was told to assure the free passage of the family.[187] The Americans agreed to use Caesar for this purpose, but worried Constantinople would not allow citizens of belligerent nations to leave Turkey. They advised that the Strass-Moscovitw family stay in Beirut for a month and asked the Spanish government to petition the Ottomans for approval of their departure.[188]
Yet Des Moines became an object of inquiry for another reason. After nearly five months, British forces fell to Ottoman hands after the Siege of Kut ended in April 1916. Around 10,000 prisoners of war were captured by the Turks, and the British sought ways of providing their men with provisions and clothes. They envisioned using an American ship to bypass the French blockade and enter the port of Mersin, in Southeastern Turkey, where after the Turks would supply the British prisoners.[189] In October, the French Navy agreed to the plan.[190][191]
Des Moines was ultimately selected to supply the British prisoners, to provide supplies to Palestine, and to pick up American citizens in Palestine. This was despite concerns by the British that Des Moines was too small to supply all of their soldiers.[192][193] Already on December 12th, the French Foreign Ministry wrote to the French Ambassador in Washington that Des Moines was in harbor in Alexandria, prepared to transport medicine and 100,000 pounds of gold procured by the Zionist Organization in New York to Palestine.[194]
The plan was met with concerns. In a letter to the Foreign Office, the British Ambassador to Washington, Cecil Spring-Rice, voiced concern that the Turks would insist on distributing supplies to the prisoners themselves.[195] This could compromise the effectiveness of the mission. Additionally, he feared that if the Turks controlled distribution in Palestine, then the Zionist supply package to Jews in Palestine would be compromised. In November, the French worried that allowing Des Moines passage would compromise the impartiality of the blockade.[196] On December 31st, the Americans raised further objections about entering Mersin due to the presence of mines off the coast.[197]
Thus, on December 27th Des Moines remained in port in Alexandria. The French were upset and noted that the cruiser had been slowed by the refusal of the port to allow Americans to board.[198] Furthermore, the necessary arrangements with the Ottomans had still not been attained and the Allies in Alexandria feared the possibility that the crew of the ship was not American, but German, based on certain, false reports.[199]
1917
After more than two years of fighting in a conflict which was expected to be both short and popular, Allied and Axis populations alike grew war-weary even as their governments remained staunchly committed. By 1917, some of the most horrific battles in history had already taken placed, including the Battle of Verdun, the Battle of the Somme, the Brusilov Offensive, and the Gallipoli Campaign. And neither side appeared to have an obvious upper hand – even as the US looked increasingly closer to joining the war, internal disorder in Russia threatened the entire Eastern Front.
Confusion and uncertainty remained a dominant theme in the Eastern Mediterranean. As hopes for both Caesar and Des Moines had been high toward the end of 1916, by 1917 things looked different. In January, Admiral Ariane informed the Americans that he believed Caesar could not safely travel to Beirut. Moreover, the French denied any responsibility for the success or failure of the mission.[200] The Americans received information from the Ottomans that mines were positioned off the coast of Beirut, rendering a supply mission dangerous.[201] The British meanwhile, still desperate to supply their captured troops, requested French permission to allow Caesar to visit Beirut, Jaffa, and Mersina with 600 tons of food.[202] At the end of January, both Caesar and Des Moines remained in harbor in Alexandria: Admiral de Spitz claimed he had been instructed not to let ships pass through the French blockade.[203] Admiral Ariane also prevented the ships from leaving port, per the French Navy’s instructions.[204]
In February, the French seem to have changed their mind and grant USS Caesar passage through the blockade on the condition of Ottoman assurance.[205] The British repeated their petition to allow the Des Moines or Caesar to aid the British prisoners, and the French finally agreed to allow Des Moines to pass supplies to Mersin.[206][207] On February 5th, Admiral de Spitz granted complete authorization, as long as the US assumed sole responsibility for the voyage.[208] The fate of these ships remained incomplete in the archives examined.
In March, a letter from Vice-Admiral Georges Varney provided insight into French policy in Ruad.[209] He argued against accepting refugees coming from the coast, writing “do not give them any hope.” The letter was written in response to a Muslim refugee landing on the island providing information on Lebanon. According to him, if just 3-4,000 French troops landed in Tripoli, they would be quickly joined by 20,000 locals. The Syrians wanted to know if the French were aware of the extent of their suffering and if they could count on French support. Varney said that the Turks and Germans were preparing coastal defenses, so now was the moment to intervene. If France did nothing, then it would be met by dead bodies and hatred by the locals. He also suggested that some Turkish soldiers might defect in return for food.
Discussions between the French and Syrians did occur. In May, Picot talked with influential Syrians of all religions in which he apologized for French neglect. Not promising independence, he argued that only France could liberate Syria but that did not decrease the ancient rights of the Syrians. Armenians and Syrians both promised full support: the cause of the Arabs, Picot concluded, was in line with that of the French.[210] In another document, Picot wrote how a plot to provide famine victims in Syria with one million francs had been approved.[211]
French inquiries into the state of affairs in the Near East took place throughout 1917. In a political and military bulletin from May, Lieutenant-Colonel de Piépape illuminated Djemal Pasha’s rule.[212] Pasha worked to increase his own fortune and cared little for the population of Palestine, which was systematically being evacuated in fear of Allied advance there. Women had been ordered to work in the agricultural sector, and Pasha’s actions inflamed the Arab-Turk antagonism. Another document by Defrance, also from May, accused Djemal Pasha of wanting to move the Arabs of Palestine to Anotolia and to replace them with ethnic Turks.[213]
Intelligence attained by a Syrian offered an insider perspective.[214] The author described disease outbreaks, starvation, the selling of Christian women to Muslims, poverty, famine, etc. He concluded by asking: when will France arrive to help this poor country and to alleviate its suffering? Why does Paris hesitate, when there is no army to defend Syria? Does France not know that Muslims and Christians would both support a French expedition?
Despite such worrying reports, French military reports from around the same time revealed that the Turks were preparing defenses for an amphibious assault, including submarine warfare off the coast of Beirut.[215] The document detailed how Turkish troops in Syria were moving south, and many villages were empty of anyone except soldiers. 10,000 reserve troops were stationed in Damascus, though the soldiers were poorly equipped and malnourished. While the report did describe the spread of disease in the country, it also noted that Typhus had declined. On a more tragic note, the report corroborated accusations of the Turks seeking to replace local populations with ethnic Turks from Anatolia.
A further military report from the beginning of July provided more details.[216] The Turks were building trenches in anticipation of an assault on Palestine and there was a flurry of movement of artillery, airplanes, munitions, and troops. Additionally, Istanbul had ordered the construction of railroads for the military in the region. After the victory at Gaza, Turkish morale improved, a development noted in another document by Piépape,[217] though famine was widespread in Beirut as well as Damascus. There were rumors that Djemal Pasha sought assassins to kill the Sharif of Mecca. An incident where Turkish soldiers were killed, according to the report, was isolated and not a sign of a general revolt.
In late June, Defrance sent a broad analysis of the situation to Paris.[218] The deportation of natives away from the Palestinian coast began on April 10th and the exile of prominent Muslim and Christian families from Jerusalem had been exaggerated. Djemal Pasha claimed that if he could not defeat the English, he would empty the land of people and trees. New officials were been named by Istanbul, including a new governor of Lebanon Ismaïl Hakki Bey. Ottoman journals praised Turkish military efforts as Jihad. The good rain meant that crop yields were likely to be abundant, but the lack of people meant soldiers were occupied with the harvest, 2/3 which went to the army. Despite Pasha’s efforts, trust in paper money remained low.
The report continued: the Turks were working to defend Gaza and Falkenhayn arrived to organize the city’s defense. There was widespread discontent, especially among minority populations such as the Alawites, who resisted conscription. While Orthodox Christians in Egypt did not want to see French intervention, Maronites and other Christians in Egypt did. According to Egyptian journals, Syrian patriotism was weak for three reasons: 1) foreign schools in the country, 2) poor Ottoman administration, and 3) emigration.
A further set of documents from early July confirmed much of June’s report.[219] It described mutinies, desertions, demoralization, the spread of cholera, problems with paper money, and wide discontentment. Falkenhayn’s arrival in Aleppo signified Turkish efforts to counter British advancements around Bagdad. Prominent Syrians wrote about the intellectual and moral equality between Europeans and Arabs, with the implication that the Syrians deserved independence.
Additionally, the report insinuated that certain personalities exaggerated both the extent of the famine, a theme of another document,[220] as well as the number of locals who would be able to join a French expeditionary force. An Egyptian paper estimated 200,000 deaths since the beginning of the war; Lloyd George estimates an astounding 300,000 deaths.[221] The Lebanese seemed to believe that the Turks wanted to eliminate them, and important Syrian leaders and members of the clergy, specifically those from the Mar Abda convent, were accused of allowing mass starvation to occur.
Djemal Pasha’s activities were controversial.[222] He ordered controls on food prices to alleviate hunger, corroborated in another document,[223] helped distribute money to those suffering in Beirut, and provided access to free food for 22,000 Syrians each day. Yet the military acquisition of grain worsened the famine and Pasha was accused of illegally profiting from silk trade with Switzerland. A political bulletin from late July noted that the latest harvest was abundant and the suffering in Syria had not worsened.[224]
By August, after the American entry into the war but prior to the October Revolution in Russia, French confidence in an Allied victory grew. Leaders in France eagerly awaited the annexation of Syria and Lebanon and collected arguments to legitimize that takeover. One article analyzed by the French came from Mr. Darian, the Maronite Patriarch in Egypt. In his published essay, “Historic Study on the Origin of the Maronite Community and its Autonomy on Mount Lebanon since Antiquity to the Present,” Darian made a comprehensive argument about France’s unique historic interests in Lebanon.[225]
With strong evidence, according to Defrance, the Patriarch demonstrated how the Maronites relied on French protection from Muslims and Druze throughout the centuries. Therefore, the Maronites should welcome a French protectorate around Mount Lebanon. Many Syrians criticized the article for dividing the religious communities and for purportedly seeking to separate Lebanon from Syria. Furthermore, Darian’s argument that the Maronites were a separate nation descended from the Phoenicians who lost their language, Syriac, due to Arab invaders was wanting of greater evidence. Nevertheless, the French found the article intriguing.
A report from August offered new insight into the situation in Syria.[226] It explained growing Germano-Turkish enmity despite a growing number of Turks studying in Germany. Moreover, Bedouins and other Nomads occasionally massacred Turkish troops, who themselves were massacring Greeks. Turkish leaders ordered the replacement of Arab employees by Turks, and 17-year-olds were beginning to be recruited. Istanbul undertook irrigation and infrastructure projects, as well as food-rationing projects in large cities. Meanwhile, Enver and Djemal Pasha both visited Beirut to improve relations there. Despite the large harvest and efforts to distribute wheat by Ali Munif,[227] famine was still widespread and much of the produce was sent to Germany.
The French took particular interest in a German-language publication from the Turkish journal “Lloyd Ottoman” (Osmanischer Lloyd) from August.[228] The article, titled “Hypocrisy of the Entente Revealed” was written by someone under the name Chékil Arslan Bey and argued that the French blockade was the origin of the famine in Syria. According to the author, the Allied powers acted as though they supported the indigenous peoples of Syria and Palestine, but in truth they did not envision an independent Arab state. Rather, they sought to annex Ottoman territories after the war. One instance which the article cited was the famine in Syria: although the French acted as if they cared for the wellbeing of the natives, in fact they were the origin of the famine via their draconian naval blockade. In addition to stopping food imports, the blockade prevented Syrians from abroad from sending remittances back to their suffering families.
The author’s central point was that France, the UK, and even the US were not humanitarian powers but rather self-interested states. The two ships which the Americans sent to improve their reputation in the region – a reference to USS Caesar and USS Des Moines – failed in their mission because of the poor organization of aid distribution. The article continued to ask poignant questions directed at the French and British leadership: Why did you not allow more cereals to reach Syria? Why did you not allow Syrian citizens to send remittances? Why did you not have Spain or the Pope, for instance, send goods in your name? Chékil Arslan Bey concluded by noting how Istanbul has done its best to relieve the suffering of the Syrians despite the French blockade through, for instance, organizing soup kitchens and orphanages.
Despite the reproaches of the article, the French in particular were concerned with the famine in Syria. And in the month following the article’s publication, a scheme by the Pope to send aid to the region was accepted by the Turks[229] on the request of the apostolic papal delegate, Mr. Dolci.[230] The British intentions were less clear, and a document from September by the French government asked for specific guarantees from London that aid would only go to the local population in Syria, rather than to any other group.[231] Ultimately there were no further documents relating to the specific plan to distribute aid in the region.
In October, the French received a comprehensive intelligence report on Syria and Lebanon from the Dominican priest and informant Father Jaussen.[232] According to him, prior to the war there were 565,000 Christians in Syria. The Maronites used to number 315,000 but had declined to about 250,000 due to the famine. Ever since the crusades the Maronites were considered a bit like the Franks of Syria and still were deeply attached to France. The Greek Christians of Syria numbered around 140,000 and were Francophile as well, though the Russians had greater influence than the French over the Hellenized Christians. Additionally, there were around 15,000 Latin Catholics, 42,000 “United Syrian” Christians, around 20,000 Protestant converts, and smaller communities of Armenians, Chaldeans, “schismatics,” Jacobites, and Nestorians. All of them were oppressed, were largely Francophile, and desired European governance – especially as mosques in Beirut and Damascus preached for the massacring of Christians. They would welcome French troops and could add 5-10,000 auxiliary soldiers.
Father Jaussen’s report also detailed the Muslims of Syria, which made up a bit less than 2/3 of the population. The vast majority were Sunni and every large city except for Beirut had a Muslim majority. While Kurds and Circassians, and some of the 20-25,000 Algerians supported the Turks, most Muslims opposed them. The Turks themselves made up 1/6 of the Muslim population of Syria while the majority was Arab. The Shi’a Metoualis, numbering around 75,000, both hated the Turks and favored the French. Nomadic groups like the Anezeh generally were antagonistic toward the Turks. Muslims and Christians alike felt incapable of revolting without the support of a European power – the Christians favored the French while the Muslims tended to favor the British. Muslim Arabs most often sought complete independence rather than becoming part of a European protectorate.
The non-Muslim and non-Christian populations tended to oppose the Turks, according to Father Jaussen. The Druze numbered 140,000 and preferred the English as they had conflicts with the French-supporting Maronites. The Yazidis were too small to be of much importance. Meanwhile the Jews were only significant in Palestine, where they benefitted from excellent financial connections. Overall, Father Jaussen concluded, the French maintained the greatest influence in the region due to their schools, missionaries, charities, and hospitals. The British and Americans both had moderate degrees of influence, followed by Germany and lastly by Italy and Russia. According to the Father Jaussen, Palestine was integral to Syria.[233]
Another set of documents from October provided more details on the situation in Syria.[234] Tensions between Djemal and Enver Pasha grew as the former opposed the latter’s intention to send Syrian grain to Germany. German experts, meanwhile, improved the Turkish military and air force in particular. Istanbul crushed an Alawite revolt and has forced Christians from Tartous to Latakeih to abandon the coast. Jews left Jerusalem due to famine and Major Lawrence incited a Bedouin revolt against the Turks. According to the report, one Beirut-based lawyer estimated the number of famine deaths in Syria to be 180,000.
By December, the Party of Union and Progress elected Talaat Pasha as President – a man who excused the Armenian massacre as necessary to protect the Turkish army in the Caucasus.[235] German power over Turkey grew and both Germans and Bulgarians were expected to arrive in Mesopotamia. According to the December document, the French took Jerusalem’s archives and the city was evacuated in expectation of an Allied assault.[236] A letter from the Maronite Patriarch in December offered gratitude for all that France has done for Lebanon and expressed interest in becoming a French protectorate.[237]
1918
In the last year of the Great War, military leaders on all sides made desperate attempts to break the enemy through bold campaigns. In January the Spanish flu broke out across the globe, killing between 50-100 million people. In April the first tank battle in history took place in the context of the unsuccessful German Spring Offensive on the Western Front. After the success of the October Revolution in November of 1917, the first communist state in the world – the Soviet Union – came into being, negotiating peace favorable to the Axis in March of 1918. In Mesopotamia, British forces had made impressive gains against the Ottomans, conquering the important city of Baghdad in March of 1917. Ultimately, the Axis could not maintain their war efforts in light of the timely entry of fresh American forces.
As the British and French forces advanced against the Ottomans, the old Anglo-French rivalry flared again – both sides seeking to attain the most territory in the aftermath of the war. A slightly cryptic message from January concerned Sykes and Picot.[238] In that document, it was revealed that the Foreign Office awarded Sykes with the position of executive charge of affairs in Palestine and Hejaz. Moreover, Sykes wanted Picot to keep something – likely the plan to divide the Middle East – secret until the state of England gave official notice.
In spite of promises regarding territorial compensation, the French became increasingly anxious about their negotiating position. For Paris it was imperative that French forces played a role in liberating Syria in order to bolster French claims to the region. A document from mid-January by Colonel Brémond and Mr. de Margerie stated just this.[239] The authors insisted that the English approach through Palestine left France no choice but to act or to abandon Syria entirely. They continued to expound the French position when they wrote that an independent Syria was impossible because it would either lead to chaos or to overpowered religious leaders unfavorable to France. They suggested that 50-60,000 soldiers would be necessary and believed indigenous Arabs, Armenians, and 4,900 Italian troops at Port Said could join the expeditionary force. A different report from January compared action in Syria/Palestine favorably to an attack in the Persian Gulf, which would require at least 200,000 soldiers.[240]
In addition to schemes in Syria, some French leaders also hoped to see Palestine under French control. A document from February considered Palestine’s future.[241] Any plan that hoped to turn Palestine into a Jewish kingdom, according to the French, would fail due to Muslim outrage. For this reason, Palestine must be included in Greater Syria. Moreover, the document responded to critics of French imperial expansion in Syria like a certain Mr. Zénié who feared Syria would become disastrous just like Algeria. Mr. Zénié was wrong, per the document, because while Algeria had always been hostile toward France, Syria was generally pro-France.
Seeking both to ease French annexation and to more efficiently profit from expanding into Syria, Paris sought to collect detailed and comprehensive information on the territory. The French Ambassador in Berne sent a translated article from the German paper “Wirtschafts Zeitung” to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, detailing Syrian economic statistics.[242] The paper noted that Syria’s population of three million could not feed itself, its agricultural techniques were primitive, much of the population was nomadic, and industry was highly underdeveloped. The paper concluded that with certain reforms – such as better technology and greater freedom for the peasants – Syria could become much wealthier.
Another detailed report on Syria was composed in February.[243] In addition to describing the economic situation in Syria, the documents remarked on the recent intellectual and societal changes, including the rise of feminism and both judicial and religious reforms. The war had seriously strained the region, which was experiencing an industrial and agricultural crisis as well as inflation and resource shortages. The Turkish military was in a very poor state and the entire population desired peace – even at the cost of European occupation. The replacement of Djemal Pasha by Falkenhayn increased anti-German sentiment and the entire Ottoman Empire was in distress.
By March, the British had advanced deep into Palestine. With the region’s imminent liberation, the French examined Syria and Palestine more closely than any prior month of the war. The humanitarian doctor Paul Chatinières informed the French government of the terrible health situation in Palestine: cholera, malaria, typhus, and other diseases were widespread.[244] The French and English collaborated on medical assistance, and the French hospital in Bethlehem reopened, but the situation remained dire. Growing anti-German sentiment began to negatively impact the Axis military, as Falkenhayn relayed that he would have abandoned Syria, viewing it as indefensible.[245] Meanwhile the Turks shot 200 residents of Nablus for refusing to evacuate the city in March.[246]
Notes on the actual military state of affairs in the region came frequently as Allied forces pushed north. On March 10th the Arab legion was disbanded and the French detachment in Palestine expanded.[247] On March 11th, a report noted that French troops arrived in Bizerte and Port Said.[248] The British argued against an expansion of French forces in Palestine, while the French hoped to work in conjunction with the Italian contingent while not intervening in areas considered by Italy to be in the Italian sphere of influence.[249]
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs Simon Pichon told Picot to inform Allenby that France was determined to play a role in liberating the territories assigned to France, despite military difficulties,[250] a sentiment echoed by Picot.[251] And indeed, the French enacted plans to reinforce the British forces in Palestine even though the War Office did not think there were enough supplies for such a large force.[252] A document listed the regiments to be sent to Palestine.[253]
A letter from Lord Balfour to the French Ambassador in London echoed the supply problem, but the French insisted on the presence of French troops.[254] In mid-March, some Arabs – having learned about the English promises to the Zionists with regard to Palestine – turned toward Berlin, disillusioned with London.[255] By at least March 19th, the French reneged on its promise to not encroach on the Italian zone of influence, and committed more troops to liberating all parts of Syria.[256] The French Ambassador to Rome, Camille Barrère, informed the Italians of this, and his letter expressed confusion as he had thought the Italians had previously agreed to French special privileges in the region.[257] While Paris recognized that it lacked sufficient forces to open a new front, it hoped to use British resources and local Armenians to keep pushing northwards with the goal of surpassing Aleppo.[258] Meanwhile, British forces from Australia, New Zealand, and India continued to arrive in Palestine.[259]
Throughout March, the French put into action plans to expand French influence in Syria and Palestine. One document proposed the establishment of an international regime in Palestine after the conclusion of peace.[260] Various policies were implemented in order to expand French influence. In late March, for instance, Picot expressed desire to expand the French-created police corps currently in operation around Saint Sepulcher to both Bethlehem and the Mosque of Omar.[261] Picot also wanted to send the French Franciscan, Father Prosper Viaud, to Jerusalem.[262] Moreover, France sought to expand its influence amongst the Christians in Palestine through support from the Vatican Custodian of the Holy Land.
In this latter goal, the French faced some difficulties and miscommunication problems. In the beginning of March, the Custodian Ferdinando Diotallevi supposedly expressed a hostile attitude toward France and the idea of a French protectorate.[263] The Cardinal Bonaventura Ceretti then accused Barrère of being ordered by the French government to reproach the Vatican for the hostile attitude of the Diotallevi.[264] Both sides were unclear as to the stance of the other. Diotallevi then purportedly stipulated that the Order of St. John refuse to pass out bread to the poor in Jerusalem.[265]
Insulted, the French argued strongly for the legitimacy of a French protectorate.[266] Their claims rested first on international law following the Ottoman capitulation, second on the orders given by the Holy See to Catholic communities, and third on the special privileges granted to France in the “Livre Blanc” (White Book). The Vatican had supposedly ordered that the French Representative be given ceremonial religious honors in Jerusalem in part to protect Catholics from the Greek Orthodox community. By at least March 18th, Diotallevi agreed to make the French Representative an honored consul at the conclusion of peace.[267] Picot then propoesed that the French government fund and replace certain friars in Jerusalem in order to expand food distributions and consequently improve French repute in the city.[268] On March 25th, the French confirmed that the Pope had ordered Diotallevi to reestablish the traditional French honors at the end of the war in an address to the Bishop of Périgueux.[269]
In addition to complications stemming from the Papacy, the French faced criticism for their goal of a French Protectorate from Syrians. A significant and influential Lebanese memorandum written in Cairo by the Lebanese Alliance,[270] for example, argued in favor of complete independence and against French pretensions in Syria.[271] In response to that memorandum, Pichon received a letter from a certain Lebanese man, Dr. Khoury.[272] In the letter, Khoury expressed his deep attachment to France and his disapproval of the memorandum – France had rights in Lebanon and must be the guarantor of Lebanese independence.
An Arab publication from April also concerned itself with the future of Syria.[273] In it, the author argued that the Allies hope to see an independent and free Syria but first the French needed to help establish a sustainable government. Without a temporary French protectorate, argued the article, the country would descend into anarchy, disorder, and hatred. One document noted that Syrians abroad – in particular in Egypt – expressed disappointment at the prospect of a French protectorate, while Syrians and Lebanese in those territories loved France and were thankful for liberation.[274] By April the French had crossed the Jordan River and then began to move forces into Syria.[275]
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, a joint French-British military administration was put in place until 1920 when a short-lived Arab Kingdom of Syria under Emir Faisal was established. Despite widespread hope for complete Arab independence, the French were intent on controlling Syria and defeated the Arabs in the Franco-Syrian war from March-July, 1920. With the establishment of the French Mandate of Syria, in accord with the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, Syria would remain under the rule of Paris until 1945.
[1] Serie Guerre 867 > Anti-Turkish Near Easterners > 01.12.14: Arab Revolt Plans1-2
[2] Serie Guerre 867 > Anti-Turkish Near Easterners > 18.12.14: Brits and Maronite Revolt1-2
[3] Serie Guerre 867 > Anti-Turkish Near Easterners > nodate: Fr. supply Maronites with arms
[4] Serie Guerre 867 > Anti-Turkish Near Easterners > 09.09.14: Lebanese want intervention1-2
[5] Serie Guerre 867 > Anti-Turkish Near Easterners > 12.11.14: Lebanese militias Egypt
[6] Serie Guerre 867 > Contemplating French Intervention > 05.09.14: Picot on intervention1-3
[7] Serie Guerre 100001 > Turkish Actions in Syria > 07.10.14: Anti-Turkish element in Lebanon1-4
[8] Serie Guerre 867 > Contemplating French Intervention > 23.12.14: Defrance on Syria1-4
[9] Serie Guerre 867 > Contemplating French Intervention > 23.12.14: Near Easterners want Fr. Intervention1-2
[10] Serie Guerre 867 > Contemplating French Intervention > 23.12.14: Defrance on Syria1-4
[11] Serie Guerre 867 > Contemplating French Intervention > 23.12.14: Near Easterners want Fr. Intervention1-2
[12] Serie Guerre 867 > Contemplating French Intervention > 25.11.14: Fr. say Syrians_Lebanese are anti-Turkish1-2
[13] Serie Guerre 867 > Contemplating French Intervention > 16.11.14: French Naval Blockade1-2
[14] Serie Guerre 867 > Contemplating French Intervention > 27.11.14: Current Situation Syria_Lebanon1-3
[15] Serie Guerre 867 > Dossier > General Considerations > nodate: General Considerations1-8
[16] Serie Guerre 867 > Dossier > General Considerations > nodate: General Considerations1-8
[17] Serie Guerre 867 > Dossier > General Considerations > nodate: operations project1-7
[18] Serie Guerre 867 > Lebanese League of Progress > 03.11.14: Lebanese League of Progress1-5
[19] Serie Guerre 867 > Syrian Situation > 28.12.14: Letter on Situation in Syria1-21
[20] Serie Guerre 867 > Turkish Actions > 01.12.14: Events in Syria1-2
[21] Serie Guerre 867 > Turkish Actions > 20.11.14: Diplomats imprisoned1-4
[22] Serie Guerre 867 > Syrian Situation > 28.12.14: Letter on Situation in Syria1-21
[23] Serie Guerre 1059 > Blockade Plan > Blockade August 1915 > 27.8.15 Blockade Ordered (typed)
[24] Serie Guerre 1059 > Blockade Plan > Blockade June 1915 > 6.1.15 to UK Embassy
[25] Serie Guerre 867 > Contemplating French Intervention > 09.01.15: Britain military Syria
[26] Serie Guerre 870 > British Ambitions in Syria > 25.07.15: British Ambitions in Syria1-12
[27] Serie Guerre 871 > British French Tension > 16.11.15: British French Tension
[28] Serie Guerre 871 > British French Tension > 16.11.15: British French Alexandretta
[29] Serie Guerre 870 > Other > 21.10.15: Syrian Muslim Committee1-2
[30] Serie Guerre 870 > British Ambitions in Syria > 25.07.15: British Ambitions in Syria1-12
[31] Serie Guerre 870 > Berlin Article on Near East > 23.08.15: Berlin Article1-4
[32] Serie Guerre 870 > French Territorial Demands > nodate: map of French Territorial Demands
[33] Serie Guerre 870 > French Territorial Demands > 19.08.15: France Territorial Demands1-2
[34] Serie Guerre 867 > On the Question of Syria (Economy) > 1915: Question of Syria1-25
[35] Serie Guerre 871 > Economic Analysis of Syria > 15.01.16: Economic analysis of Syria1-8
[36] Serie Guerre 867 > On the Question of Syria (Economy) > 07.06.15: Lyonese Merchants Support Syria1-2
[37] Serie Guerre 870 > Question of Syria > 04.10.15: Question of Syria1-8
[38] Serie Guerre 870 > Turkish Oppression and Revolts > 10.09.15: Turkish Martial Law1-2
[39] Serie Guerre 870 > Situation in Syria > 20.10.15: Djemal Pasha Syria
[40] Serie Guerre 870 > Situation in Syria > 07.09.15: Syrian Refugee on Syria Situation1-5
[41] Serie Guerre 870 > Situation in Syria > 07.09.15: Syrian Refugee on Syria Situation1-5
[42] Serie Guerre 870 > Turkish Oppression and Revolts > 22.10.15: Armenian Revolt1-2
[43] Serie Guerre 870 > Situation in Syria > 20.10.15: General Situation Near East
[44] Serie Guerre 867 > Lebanese League of Progress > 04.06.15: Massacre Christians1-4
[45] Serie Guerre 870 > Situation in Syria > 23.08.15: News on Syria1-8
[46] Serie Guerre 870 > Turkish Oppression and Revolts > 10.09.15: Turkish Martial Law1-2
[47] Serie Guerre 870 > Ruad > 07.09.15: Ruad occupation
[48] Serie Guerre 870 > Ruad > 21.09.15: Ruad Occupation1-2
[49] Serie Guerre 870 > Situation in Syria > 20.10.15: General Situation Near East
[50] Serie Guerre 870 > Turkish Oppression and Revolts > 10.09.15: Turkish Martial Law1-2
[51] Serie Guerre 870 > Tension in Syria > 22.09.15: Tension in Syria1-9
[52] Serie Guerre 871 > Sykes and Picot Discussions > 06.01.16: Picot and Syria1-8
[53] Serie Guerre 871 > Sykes and Picot Discussions > 06.01.16: Claims in Middle East1-6
[54] Serie Guerre 872 > Plans for After the War > 26.04.16: Sazanoff Letters1-6
[55] Serie Guerre 876 > French Consider Intervention > 14.04.16: Sykes advocates intervention1-2
[56] Serie Guerre 873 > French and US Committees on Syria > 15.06.16: Commercial Geography Society of Bordeaux
[57] Serie Guerre 873 > French deliberate future of Near East > 10.07.16: Society of Colonial and Maritime Studies1-2
[58] Serie Guerre 872 > Famine > 07.04.16: Mokattam Articles1-8
[59] Serie Guerre 872 > Famine > 10.02.16: Al-Mokattam misery in Near East1-4
[60] Serie Guerre 872 > Famine > 22.04.16: Mokattam Hunger1-2
[61] Serie Guerre 872 > Famine > 10.04.16: State of Constantinople and Anatolia1-3
[62] Serie Guerre 872 > Famine > 21.05.16: Systematic Famine
[63] Serie Guerre 873 > Local Papers > 15.05.16: Al Ahram: State Syria1-4
[64] Serie Guerre 872 > State of Lebanon and Syria > 24.04.16: El Mokattam Articles1-7
[65] Serie Guerre 876 > Mokattam > 01.04.16: Turks want starvation
[66] Serie Guerre 872 > State of Lebanon and Syria > 24.04.16: El Mokattam Articles1-7
[67] Serie Guerre 872 > State of Lebanon and Syria > 24.04.16: El Mokattam Articles1-7
[68] Serie Guerre 876 > Situation Turkey Proper > 11.04.16: Anatolia situation1-3
[69] Serie Guerre 876 > Situation Turkey Proper > 10.04.16: starvation constantinople1-2
[70] Serie Guerre 872 > State of Lebanon and Syria > 01.04.16: Accounts of Syria1-10
[71] Serie Guerre 872 > French Weigh Intervention > 01.04.16: Bey and Risquallah on Syria1-5
[72] Serie Guerre 872 > State of Lebanon and Syria > nodate: State of Lebanon1-4
[73] Serie Guerre 872 > Political Situation > 16.04.16: Political Situation in Syria1-3
[74] Serie Guerre 876 > French Consider Intervention > nodate: should intervene before harvest
[75] Serie Guerre 872 > Political Situation > nodate: Political Situation Syria1-3
[76] Serie Guerre 872 > State of Lebanon and Syria > 24.02.16: League of Progress1-3
[77] Serie Guerre 871 > Other > 12.01.16: Constantin Melham1-3
[78] Serie Guerre 871 > Other > 12.01.16: 24.10.15: Venezuelan Syrians
[79] Serie Guerre 872 > French Consulate Documents > nodate: French Consulate Papers1-2
[80] Serie Guerre 872 > French Consulate Documents > 21.05.16: Consulate Documents and Death Sentences1
[81] Serie Guerre 872 > State of Lebanon and Syria > 13.05.16: State of Syria
[82] Serie Guerre 872 > Political Situation > Djemal Pasha > nodate: Djemal Pasha1-4
[83] Serie Guerre 872 > State of Lebanon and Syria > 08.05.16: Ruad Island Syria Situation1-3
[84] Serie Guerre 873 > French Consider Intervention > 11.07.16: Hope on invading1-12
[85] Serie Guerre 872 > Patriarch and Maronites > 14.04.16: Sykes on Alexandretta Intervention1-2
[86] Serie Guerre 872 > Patriarch and Maronites > 21.05.16: Father Jaussen on Near East1-3
[87] Serie Guerre 872 > State of Lebanon and Syria > 1916: Agent Koneri1-3
[88] Serie Guerre 873 > Local Papers > 22.05.16: Agent Koneri on Near East1-9
[89] Serie Guerre 871 > Operations in Syria and Karaman > 11.01.16: Operations in Syria and Karaman1-13
[90] Serie Guerre 872 > French Weigh Intervention > 03.05.16: Danger of Intervention
[91] Serie Guerre 873 > French Consider Intervention > 05.06.16: Anti Intervention1-2
[92] Serie Guerre 872 > French Weigh Intervention > 05.05.16: Possibility of French intervention1-7
[93] Serie Guerre 872 > Military Situation > 22.06.16: Military Situation Syria1-5
[94] Serie Guerre 872 > French Weigh Intervention > 07.03.16: Syrian Informant Mission
[95] Serie Guerre 873 > French and US Committees on Syria > 14.06.16: Commission of Exterior Affairs
[96] Serie Guerre 873 > French and US Committees on Syria > 27.05.16: French aid to Syria
[97] Serie Guerre 873 > French deliberate future of Near East > 22.05.16: French are pro-Syrian
[98] Serie Guerre 873 > French and US Committees on Syria > 30.06.16: French Action Committee on Syria
[99] Serie Guerre 873 > Military Situation > 22.07.16: Letter on Syria1-4
[100] Serie Guerre 873 > Other > 22.05.16: Maronite Patriarch on Lebanon1-6
[101] Serie Guerre 100001 > Maronite > 01-24.10.16: Maronite Letters1-2
[102] Serie Guerre 873 > Local Papers > 03.06.16: Turkish German newspaper
[103] Serie Guerre 100001 > French Occupation of Syria and Lebanon > nodate: French Occupation1-7
[104] Serie Guerre 873 > State of Near East > 02.06.16: Flour Quality1-2
[105] Serie Guerre 873 > State of Near East > 05.07.16: State of Syria and Lebanon1-4
[106] Serie Guerre 873 > State of Near East > 09.06.16: Religious Repression Letter1
[107] Serie Guerre 873 > State of Near East > 9.05.16: state of Lebanon1-3
[108] Serie Guerre 873 > State of Near East > 20.06.16: French Embassy Rome1-6
[109] Serie Guerre 873 > Summary of Situation > III Djemal Pasha
[110] Serie Guerre 873 > Summary of Situation > IV Political Situation1-2
[111] Serie Guerre 873 > Summary of Situation > VI Patriarche Maronite1-3
[112] Serie Guerre 873 > French Consider Intervention > 24.05.16: French against intervention1-2
[113] Serie Guerre 873 > French and US Committees on Syria > 08.06.16: American Committee for Syria1
[114] Serie Guerre 873 > French and US Committees on Syria > 10.06.16: US Maronites send help1
[115] Serie Guerre 873 > French vs British > 02.06.16: Syria situation1-3
[116] Serie Guerre 873 > French vs British > 04.06.16: Give or don't give Aid1-4
[117] Serie Guerre 873 > French vs British > 04.06.16: Give or don't give Aid1-4
[118] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 18.06.16: US Turkish relations
[119] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 05.07.16: French on Syrian crisis1-4
[120] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 13.07.16: find attached letter for Spain
[121] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 06.06.16: French measures to help Syrians1-3
[122] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 28.06.16: US and German efforts1-2
[123] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 26.06.16: Turkish initial response1-2
[124] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 28.06.16: Schedid1-2
[125] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 13.07.16: Request that Spain aid Lebanon1-3
[126] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 13.07.16: US and Spanish actions1-4
[127] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 15.07.16: Spain Syria supplies
[128] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 19.07.16: Ottoman delay responding
[129] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 06.07.16: French have Americans help Syria1-5
[130] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 08.07.16: US response to lack of Turkish response
[131] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > 28.07.16: US Red Cross Syria and Germany
[132] Serie Guerre 873 > US and Spain supplying Syria > nodate: Vatican relation Turkey
[133] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > 10.08.16: Turks deny famine
[134] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > 31.08.16: Aid for Syria and money1-3
[135] Serie Guerre 874 > Other > 11.08.16: Arab Article1-3
[136] Serie Guerre 874 > Sharif of Mecca > 11.08.16: Article denouncing Lebanese1-3
[137] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > 20.09.16: French want details supplying Syria
[138] Serie Guerre 875 > Aid for Syria > 19.10.16: Constantinople deciding on Ship's passage1-2
[139] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > 02.10.16: Turkish approval
[140] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > 11.10.16: French Navy info1-4
[141] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > 29.10.16: US ship supply Syria
[142] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > 23.10.16: US aid Syria1-2
[143] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > Spain Aids Syria > 28.11.16: Spain permission help Syria
[144] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > 14.11.16: US aid to Syria Caesar
[145] Serie Guerre 100000 > Caesar Supplies > 27.12.16: Caesar schedule
[146] Serie Guerre 100000 > Caesar Supplies > 15.12.16: Red Cross and Supplies Caesar
[147] Serie Guerre 100000 > Caesar Supplies > 15.12.16: Red Cross and Supplies Caesar
[148] Serie Guerre 100000 > Caesar Supplies > nodate: Supply list Caesar
[149] Serie Guerre 100000 > Caesar Supplies > 22.12.16: Philippe on Caesar
[150] Serie Guerre 874 > Money for Syria > 28.11.16: Money for Syria
[151] Serie Guerre 874 > Money for Syria > 29.11.16: Money for Patriarch
[152] Serie Guerre 874 > Other > Ruad > 12.11.16: Funds to Ruad
[153] Serie Guerre 874 > Other > Ruad > 27.11.16: Gov of Ruad asks help1-3
[154] Serie Guerre 874 > Money for Syria > 15.11.16: Letter asking for aid1-2
[155] Serie Guerre 874 > Money for Syria > October 1916: Correspondence Patriarch1
[156] Serie Guerre 874 > French British tensions > August 1916: Division of Syria1-4
[157] Serie Guerre 874 > French British tensions > 05.10.16: El Arish
[158] Serie Guerre 874 > French British tensions > 10.10.16: French anti Expedition (typed)
[159] Serie Guerre 874 > French British tensions > 11.10.16: French British tension1-2
[160] Serie Guerre 874 > Sharif of Mecca > 30.10.16: Sharif of Mecca1-2
[161] Serie Guerre 874 > Sharif of Mecca > 30.10.16: Sharif Mecca Order1-2
[162] Serie Guerre 874 > Military Situation > 08.11.16: Ottoman food to Germany
[163] Serie Guerre 874 > Military Situation > 24.09.16: Espionage
[164] Serie Guerre 874 > Military Situation > 24.09.16: Turkish military1-2
[165] Serie Guerre 874 > Other > Djemal Pasha > nodate: Djemal Pasha2-4
[166] Serie Guerre 875 > Djemal Pasha > 25.10.16: Djemal Pasha1-5
[167] Serie Guerre 874 > On Intervention > 04.08.16: Possible intervention1-2
[168] Serie Guerre 874 > On Intervention > nodate: In favor of intervention1-11
[169] Serie Guerre 875 > Military Situation > 09.09.16: military situation levant1-10
[170] Serie Guerre 874 > Summary of Situation > 11.08.16: Situation in Syria1-5
[171] Serie Guerre 874 > Summary of Situation > 11.09.16: Situation in Lebanon1
[172] Serie Guerre 874 > Summary of Situation > 31.08.16: Starvation (3?)
[173] Serie Guerre 874 > Summary of Situation > July 1916: Worsening Situation1-8
[174] Serie Guerre 874 > Summary of Situation > 25.10.16: Cause Famine1-2
[175] Serie Guerre 875 > State of Syria Lebanon > 11.08.16: Info from Syrian on Syria1-3
[176] Serie Guerre 875 > State of Syria Lebanon > 11.11.16: Mesopotamia and Syria1-7
[177] Serie Guerre 875 > State of Syria Lebanon > 18.10.16: Navy's opinion on Syria1-5
[178] Serie Guerre 875 > State of Syria Lebanon > 23.11.16: Official suppression of privileges
[179] Serie Guerre 875 > Syrian Perspective on Turkey and France > nodate: Situation Ottomans1-7
[180] Serie Guerre 100001 > Supplying Lebanon > 03.12.16: Supplying Lebanon1-9
[181] Serie Guerre 1059 > Trade under Blockade > 19.6.16 Jewish Citrons
[182] Serie Guerre 1059 > Aid to Populations > 30.8.16: Agreement of Doctors to Palestine1-2
[183] Serie Guerre 1059 > Leaving Palestine > 7.10.16: Americans leave Palestine1-2
[184] Serie Guerre 1059 > Aid to Populations > ?:10:16 US asks French Doctors to Palestine1-2
[185] Serie Guerre 100000 > French Citizens in Near East > 05.12.16: Strass-Moscowitz Request1-3
[186] Serie Guerre 100000 > French Citizens in Near East > 16.12.16: Strass Romania
[187] Serie Guerre 100000 > French Citizens in Near East > 22.12.16: Strass-Moscowitz1-2
[188] Serie Guerre 100000 > French Citizens in Near East > 08.01.17: Fr. Citizens Turkey1-2
[189] Serie Guerre 1059 > Aid to Populations > 26:9:16 Clothes to British Prisoners1-3
[190] Serie Guerre 1059 > Aid to Populations > ?:10:16 French Navy agrees to help Prisoners
[191] Serie Guerre 1059 > Aid to Populations > 5:10:16 Clothes to British Response
[192] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 22.10.16 (?): Other ship than Des Moines
[193] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 30.10.16: Des Moines too small
[194] Serie Guerre 1059 > Aid to Populations > 12:10:16 Medicine to Palestine1-2
[195] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 30.10.16: Consequences helping Prisoners1
[196] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 24.11.16: difficulty Des Moines
[197] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 31.12.16: Mines Mersin
[198] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 27.12.16: Des Moines Problem
[199] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 27.12.16: Ottoman Arrangements
[200] Serie Guerre 100000 > Caesar Supplies > 07.01.17: Responsibility Caesar
[201] Serie Guerre 100000 > Caesar Supplies > 24.01.17: Mines Beirut
[202] Serie Guerre 100000 > Caesar Supplies > 31.01.17: Caesar Food Reqest
[203] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 30.01.17: Ships Alexandria
[204] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 01.02.17: Responsibility Transport
[205] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 02.02.17: Authorization Transport
[206] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 03.02.17: British Embassy Request1-2
[207] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 04.02.17: British Prisoners
[208] Serie Guerre 100000 > British Prisoners and Des Moines > 05.02.17: Voyage Responsibility
[209] Serie Guerre 877 > French consider intervention in Syria > 22.03.17: Extracts from a letter1-5
[210] Serie Guerre 877 > Future of Syria > 02.05.17: State of Spirits in Syria1-3
[211] Serie Guerre 877 > Famine > 14.05.17: Money for Famine victims
[212] Serie Guerre 877 > Evacuation of Syria and Palestine > 20.05.17: Evacuation of Palestine1-2
[213] Serie Guerre 877 > Evacuation of Syria and Palestine > 04.05.17: Population exchange Palestine
[214] Serie Guerre 877 > State of Syria > 24.05.17: Situation in Syria1-2
[215] Serie Guerre 877 > Military Situation > 05.05.17: Military preparations1-4
[216] Serie Guerre 877 > Military Situation > 07.06.17: Military situation1-5
[217] Serie Guerre 877 > Military Situation > 06.06.17: Political Situation and Gaza1-2
[218] Serie Guerre 877 > State of Syria > 27.06.17: State of Syria1-8
[219] Serie Guerre 878 > Situation in Syria > 07.07.17: General state of Syria1-12
[220] Serie Guerre 878 > Situation in Syria > 27.07.17: Situation in Syria1-2
[221] Serie Guerre 878 > Situation in Syria > 02.07.17: syrian victims of turkish aggression
[222] Serie Guerre 878 > Situation in Syria > 07.07.17: General state of Syria1-12
[223] Serie Guerre 878 > Situation in Syria > 27.07.17: Situation in Syria1-2
[224] Serie Guerre 878 > Situation in Syria > 27.07.17: Political bulletin1-3
[225] Serie Guerre 878 > Separating Lebanon and Syria > 15.08.17: On separation of Lebanon from Syria1-7
[226] Serie Guerre 879 > State of Syria > 08.08.17: General info on Syria1-13
[227] Serie Guerre 878 > Distributing Food in Syria > 05.08.17: Distribution of wheat
[228] Serie Guerre 879 > Hypocrisy of the Allies > 13.08.17: Turkish press publication1-7
[229] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > 19.09.17: French and British supply Syria1-2
[230] Serie Guerre 878 > Distributing Food in Syria > 10.09.17: Food transport to Syria1-2
[231] Serie Guerre 874 > Aid for Syria > 19.09.17: French and British supply Syria1-2
[232] Serie Guerre 879 > Father Jaussen on the Syrian population > 08.10.17: Father Jaussen Syrian population1-34
[233] Serie Guerre 879 > Father Jaussen on the Syrian population > 08.10.17: Father Jaussen Syrian population1-34
[234] Serie Guerre 879 > Info on Syria and Arabia > 22.10.17: Info on Syria and Arabia1-5
[235] Serie Guerre 880 > Military Situation > 13.12.17: Military Near East1-6
[236] Serie Guerre 880 > Military Situation > 13.12.17: Military Near East1-6
[237] Serie Guerre 880 > Other > 31.12.17: Lebanon Thanks France
[238] Serie Guerre 882 > Dividing the Region > 09.01.18: Sykes Picot
[239] Serie Guerre 882 > French Intervention > 16.01.18: Necessity of French action in Syria1-8
[240] Serie Guerre 882 > French Intervention > 12.01.18: french intervention1-2
[241] Serie Guerre 880 > French Designs on Region > Feb.1918: Syria can't be Independent1-3
[242] Serie Guerre 882 > Economy Syria > 24.02.18: Syria economy1-6
[243] Serie Guerre 882 > General info Syria > February 1918: General Info Syria1-21
[244] Serie Guerre 882 > State of Affairs Near East > 02.03.18: Health Palestine1-3
[245] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 24.03.18: Turkish-German tensions
[246] Serie Guerre 885 > French Occupation > 15.03.18: execution of Nablus residents
[247] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 10.03.18: Arab Legion replaced French Detachment
[248] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 11.03.18: French troops sent to Bizerte and Port Said
[249] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 12.03.18: Expansion Military Palestine1-2
[250] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 12.03.18: France Response Supply
[251] Serie Guerre 885 > French Occupation > 15.05.18(?): Purpose Fr. troops Palestine1-2
[252] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 12.03.18: Reinforce Palestine
[253] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 09.03.18: French Forces Zone of Influence1-2
[254] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 14.03.18: More troops
[255] Serie Guerre 882 > State of Affairs Near East > 16.03.18: Arabs disenchanted with English
[256] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 19.03.18: French military intentions
[257] Serie Guerre 885 > Italian Relations > 13.03.18: Italo-France relations
[258] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 19.03.18: Military operation1-8
[259] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 24.03.18: Military Advance Palestine
[260] Serie Guerre 882 > Dividing the Region > 03.03.18: Dividing the Region1-3
[261] Serie Guerre 885 > French Occupation > 24.03.18: French Police in Palestine
[262] Serie Guerre 885 > Vatican Religious Role > 26.03.18: French Catholic Influence
[263] Serie Guerre 885 > Vatican Religious Role > 11.03.18: Protectorate Attitude in Vatican
[264] Serie Guerre 885 > Vatican Religious Role > 13.03.18: Attitude of Vatican
[265] Serie Guerre 885 > Vatican Religious Role > 13.03.18: St. John no Bread
[266] Serie Guerre 885 > French Occupation > 15.03.18: Holy See Fr. Protectorate1-3
[267] Serie Guerre 885 > Vatican Religious Role > 18.03.18: Honored Fr. Consul by Pope
[268] Serie Guerre 885 > Vatican Religious Role > 18.03.18: Replace Friars in Jerusalem
[269] Serie Guerre 885 > Vatican Religious Role > 25.03.18: Pope Honors1-2
[270] Serie Guerre 885 > Future Plans for Near East > 14.03.18: Lebanese Alliance Egypt
[271] Serie Guerre 885 > French Occupation > 31.03.18: Lebanon Independence1-3
[272] Serie Guerre 885 > French Occupation > 31.03.18: Lebanon Independence1-3
[273] Serie Guerre 885 > Future Plans for Near East > 09.04.18: Syria Future1-3
[274] Serie Guerre 885 > Future Plans for Near East > 10.04.18: Syrian Disappointment1-2
[275] Serie Guerre 885 > Military Matters > 02.04.18: French Advance