Myth vs Fact: The British in Mesopotamia

Note: This piece was written in 2018 or 2019 as part of a project with historian and professor Mustafa Aksakal from Georgetown University

1)    Churchill suggested that chemical weapons be used “against recalcitrant Arabs as an experiment” and dismissed objections as “unreasonable,” stating “I am strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes…[to] spread a lively terror”

The primary basis for this quotation comes from the historian Martin Gilbert, whose biography of Winston Churchill (1975) relied on the primary sources available in British archives. Gilbert noted in his fourth volume that Churchill pressed Air Marshall Sir Hugh Trenchard, the Chief of the Air Staff, on August 29^th, 1920, to experiment with mustard gas bombs. He wanted to find out whether the bombs could “inflict punishment on recalcitrant natives without inflicting grave injury on them.”[1] The companion volume to the biography (1977), included a minute written by Churchill on May 12^th, 1919 in which Churchill defended the legitimacy of using chemical weapons in India and Iraq. It is reproduced below in full:

I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. We have definitely adopted the position at the Peace Conference of arguing in favour of gas retention as a permanent method of warfare. It is sheer affectation to lacerate a man with the poisonous fragment of a bursting shell and to boggle at making his eyes water by means of lachrymatory gas.

I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected.[2]

In 1986, an essay by Charles Townshend of Keele University brought what seemed to be the first clear evidence of the use of British chemical weapons in Iraq by paraphrasing a letter from J. A. Webster, assistant secretary at the Air Ministry, from September 1921. According to Townshend, the letter, “point[ed] out that the army had used SK gas shells in quantity against the Mesopotamian rebels in 1920 with ‘excellent moral effect.’”[3] Townshend’s writing included two oft-repeated mischaracterizations: he invented the expression “in quantity,” which appeared nowhere in the original document, and the reference to “excellent moral effect” was in fact the Air Ministry’s estimation of what gas bombs dropped from aircraft, if used, could be expected to achieve, rather than what gas shells had already achieved. Moreover, SK (ethyl iodoacetate) was a tear gas rather than an asphyxiating agent.[4] In fact, no clear evidence had been produced that the British had used poison gas in Iraq, although this has been repeated countless times.

The context behind the quotation by Churchill is to be found in deliberations among British leaders concerning the use of such weapons. In April 1919, the Royal Air Force no. 31 (Mesopotamian Wing) first requested that gas bombs be supplied “for use against recalcitrant Arabs as [an] experiment, the suggestion being concurred in by General Staff, Baghdad.”[5] The British government had not yet ruled on the legitimacy of such weapons. The secretary of state for India, Edwin Montagu, opposed the weapons. The Air Ministry, meanwhile, stated its view that “the great difficulty of differentiation between innocent and guilty once more presents itself and is merely accentuated by this form of warfare.”[6]

At this point in 1919, no gas bombs existed. The Chemical Warfare Department of the War Office, on Churchill’s prodding, experimented in late spring, but there was the challenge that each bomb weighed about 170 pounds which was beyond the carrying capacity of any service bomber outside the Handley-Page 0/400, itself unsuitable for operations from the short, unimproved airstrips in use in Iraq. Sir Hugh Trenchard, reported these findings to Churchill on May 22, advising him that “better results could be obtained by a similar bomb filled with high explosive…I am of the opinion that we are to keep to our present type of bombs, but not through any squeamishness about using gas.”[7] Churchill was adamant however and ordered Trenchard to produce an efficient gas bomb. The War Office pressed for the employment of mustard gas, notwithstanding its potential to contaminate the earth and cause injuries to innocent passersby for months after its employment. The Air Ministry, however, had a strong preference for nonlethal gases, noting that crashes in the RAF, especially when landing, were frequent occurrences and that accidental release of the more dangerous agents would pose a grave hazard to pilots and ground crews alike.[8]

            Churchill was largely in favor of developing and using gas bombs, whereas the Air Ministry was generally opposed. Churchill wrote to Sir Henry Wilson on August 27^th, 1920:

If gas shell for the artillery is available on the spot or in transit it sh[oul]d certainly be employed in the emergency prevailing. It is not considered that any question of principle is raised by such an emergency use of the limited ammunition of various kinds. As no question of principle is involved there is no need for any special declaration. G.O.C.-in-C. should defend his positions with whatever ammunition is at hand[9]

On September 17^th, 1920, Churchill gave permission – against the opinions of his fellow ministers – to ship stocks of tear gas shells to Iraq (where they had previously not existed).[10] This was in response to the Euphrates Rebellion occurring at the time. Here, Churchill again pressed Trenchard to “proceed with the experimental work on gas bombs, especially mustard gas, which would inflict punishment upon recalcitrant natives without inflicting grave injury upon them.”[11] Nevetheless, there is no documented evidence of the use of either mustard gas or tear gas by the British military in the mandate of Iraq, despite the fact that the claim continues to be repeated.[12] See Douglas’ article for a deeper analysis. Also see this website (https://winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/churchill-and-chemical-warfare/) for a look at more quotations by Churchill.

2)    Squadron leader Arthur Harris reported, “The Arab and Kurd now know what real bombing means within 45 minutes a full-sized village can be practically wiped out, and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured, by four or five machines which offer them no real target, no opportunity for glory as warriors, no effective means of escape.”

This quotation purportedly comes from a 1919 statement by the airpower chief Arthur Harris, who bombed Jalalabad and Kabul (and later Nazi Germany).[13] It is cited by Beau Grosscup in his book Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment (2013). He does not cite the source, however, but rather page 37 of D. E. Omissi’s book Air Power and Colonial Control: the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 (1990). The online version of the book, however, does not feature this citation. Nevertheless, Kim Coleman also cites Harris on page 44 of her book, A History of Chemical Warfare (Basingstoke, 2005).

Harris was not posted to Iraq until 1922.[14] Coleman provided no citation for her quotation, only an endnote reading: “Wing-Commander [sic] Arthur Harris, later known as ‘Bomber Harris,’ speaking in 1920.” The passage, however, is most likely derived from a 1924 report submitted by Harris, then commanding officer of No. 45 Squadron at Hinaidi. The report reads as follows:

Where the Arab and Kurd had just begun to realise that if they could stand a little noise, they could stand bombing, and still argue; they now know what real bombing means, in casualties and damage; they now know that within 45 minutes a full sized village, vide attached photos of Kushan-Al-Ajaza, can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured by four or five machines which offer them no real target, no opportunity for glory as warriors, no effective means of escape, and little chance of retaliation or loot such as an infantry column would afford them in producing a similar result.[15]

The quotation is to be found in different forms in other secondary sources. For instance, it is given in extended form in Marilyn Blatt Young, Toshiyuki Tanaka, and Yuki Tanaka’s book Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth-century History (New York: New Press, 2010). They cite it in the following way:

They [i.e. the Arabs and Kurds] now know what real bombing means, in casualties and damage; they now know that within 45 minutes a full sized village, vide attached photos of Kushan-Al-Ajaza, can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured by four or five machines which offer them no real target, no opportunity for glory as warriors, no effective means of escape, and little chance of retaliation or loot such as an infantry column would afford them in producing a similar result.

Night bombing is necessary to avoid a safe period intervening between daylight operations, when they return to inspect damage, eat, sleep, evacuate personnel and material, and graze their herds. Dark night work has always been carried out whenever practicable to impress upon them that aircraft are independent of daylight or moonlight.[16]

Imbesat Daudi’s Civilization & Violence: Islam, the West, and the Rest (2014), meanwhile, gives the same citation as Douglas.[17] It seems likely that this is a real quotation that does not refer to gas bombs and that comes from Harris before he had been assigned to Iraq.

3)    Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer L Haldane quoted his orders for the punishment of any Iraqi found in possession of weapons “with the utmost severity”: “The village where he resides will be destroyed pressure will be brought on the inhabitants by cutting off water power the area being cleared of the necessaries of life.” He added the warning: “Burning a village properly takes a long time, an hour or more according to size.”

The article that cites this quotation most likely came from the following website: http://archive.ppu.org.uk/iraq/occupation.html. It states that Haldane wrote the note in his personal memoir recounting his crushing of the 1920 Iraqi (Euphrates) Rebellion. The source – although seemingly reliable – is from the NGO Peace Pledge Union, which actively lobbies against anything related to war and is therefor untrustworthy. An extensive google search of the quotation does not yield any legitimate sources.

I looked through the book by Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer L. Haldane that would be most likely to have the quotation, The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920 (London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922).[18] He does write that “nothing but force” appeals to the Arabs (p. 271) and about the difficulties of enforcing disarmament. Moreover, he states that when Iraqi tribes in Samawah did not submit to the British government, “I added that the free use of aeroplanes to break the will and moral of the insurgents was advisable, and that machines in addition to those allotted to him [Major General Cory] would be sent at once from Baghdad on demand” (p. 277). But ultimately it is not until the Appendix (Appendix IX, Notes on Dealing with Villages) until I found the actual quotation (which is authentic). Here is what I discovered in context:

Apparent hesitation or delay encourages the Arab, and a few men in the average village could inflict many casualties on attacking troops (p. 341)

Rifle bombs are of great value. The Arabs hate them, and the infantry acts much more boldly when it can fire a bomb or two into a village, house or fort, or into a piece of thick cover. (p. 341)

Burning a village properly takes a long time, an hour or more according to size from the time the burning parties enter. (p. 342)

            I also found part of the text (earlier in the book) related to the first part of the quotation. It comes from Appendix VII (Memorandum Regarding Disarmament) and states:

If, hereafter, any individual is found with a rifle or round of ammunition in his possession, not only will he be dealt with the utmost severity, but the village where he resides will be destroyed. (p. 330)

The date at which rifles and ammunition are to be handed in will be fixed by the Military Commander, and if by that date effect has not been given to his orders the area concerned will be treated as rebellious. Thereupon military action will be taken deliberately, villages will be razed to the ground, and all woodwork removed. Pressure will be brought on the inhabitants by cutting off water-power and destroying water-lifts; efforts to carry out cultivation will be interfered with, and the systematic collection of supplies of all kinds beyond our actual requirements will be carried out, the area being cleared of the necessaries of life. (p. 330)